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1. Research design 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study is to arrive at satisfactory answers as to why the Syrian regime 
persists in supporting the Lebanese Hezbollah in spite of compelling reasons why it 
should cease this policy. Through the study of this problem I intend to identify by 
inference what the determinants shaping Syrian foreign policy are; is it 
predominantly domestic pressures or external threats? The relevance of elucidating 
this problem is that it will allow us to answer the question of whether Syria should be 
treated as a rouge regime that cannot be reasoned with, or if a greater understanding 
of the constraints and pressures facing the regime can clarify if it is merely playing 
the cards at its disposal in order to balance threats to its hold on power.  
The leadership strategy of late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad is often described as 
one of shrewd security maximizing calculations in accordance with the realist school 
of international relations. Through dramatic departures from the behavior one could 
expect from a leader steeped in Baathist ideology1, Hafez al-Assad gained a 
reputation as a brilliant strategist with a clear eye towards Syria’s national security 
goals (Hinnebusch 1991, 2001, 2002b, Ehteshami & Hinnebusch: 1997, Quilliam 
1999, Zisser 2001). In 2000 Hafez al-Assad died, having appointed his son, Bashar 
al-Assad, as his successor. 
Bashar al-Assad initially had no other claim to power besides being the son of his 
father. Without the personal authority and legitimacy of Hafez, it is debatable 
whether the security policy of the Baath regime can be said to be the personal domain 
of the president to the same extent as during his fathers’ presidency. The foreign 
                                              
1 Cases in point are the Syrian intervention in Beirut in 1976 to protect the Christian forces against the leftist-Palestinian 
alliance, siding with Iran in its war against Iraq, and joining with the US-led coalition in its campaign to drive Saddam 
Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait in 1991.  
 7 
policy stances that Syria has taken since 2000 has thus renewed debate as to whether 
domestic pressures and legitimacy requirements have produced policy which is more 
influenced by irredentist ideology and a need to placate vested power interests (Pipes 
1990, Lawson 1996, Deeb 2003, Rabil 2003), than one that maximizes Syria’s 
influence within the changing regional power structure.  
After the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11th 2001, U.S. President George 
W. Bush declared a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Central to this doctrine was 
that the U.S. would aggressively pursue ‘terrorists’ wherever they might be located, 
and would also target any state that supported them or gave them sanctuary (White 
House 20.9.2001). Any doubts as to the seriousness of the ultimatum made by the 
Bush-administration evaporated with the toppling of the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan later that year. Two years later the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq 
was demolished for being suspected of being willing and able to aid and abet 
‘terrorists’ in the future, in addition to allegations of a secret Iraqi program for 
production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).   
Bearing this in mind, Syria is in the unfortunate position of having had a prominent 
place on the U.S. State Department’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (DOS: 
2003a) since 1979, largely due to the support it allegedly provides to among others 
the Lebanese Hezbollah, who are classified as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the 
U.S. Government (Washington File: 2003). This was a manageable problem for Syria 
until the U.S. launched its global campaign to eradicate its ‘terrorist’ enemies. 
Pundits soon started to speculate as to whether Syria and the Hezbollah would be 
next on Washington’s to-do-list (Blanford 28.4.2002, Byman 2003, and Glass 
24.7.2003). These arguments gained stock with bellicose statements by U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage: 
“Hezbollah may be the ‘A-Team’ of terrorists and maybe al-Qaeda is 
actually the ‘B’ team. And they’re on the list and their time will come. 
There’s no question about it – it’s all in good time. And we’re going to 
go after these problems just like a high school wrestler goes after a 
match. We’re going to take them down one at a time”. (CBS 18.4.2003) 
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The U.S. demands that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon cease to meddle in 
Lebanese affairs, and desist in supporting the Hezbollah won international legitimacy 
by being put forth in a United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR 1559: 
2004). Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon in March 2005, but is still considered 
to be supportive of the Hezbollah and other political factions in Lebanon who are 
sympathetic to Syria’s interests. UNSCR 1559 can potentially open the way for far 
more comprehensive and multilateral sanctions, augmenting the sanctions the U.S. 
has imposed unilaterally under the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act of 2003 (SALSA) (White House 11.5.2004). As of yet, however, 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that the prospect of military 
action is not imminent (DOD 17.5.2004).  
Under tremendous international pressure to alter its policy on the Hezbollah, it would 
seem prudent and rational, as understood by realist theory, for Syria to seek 
appeasement, to bandwagon, with the U.S. and its allies. Not only is there a case to be 
made for the possibility of economically benefiting from improved relations with the 
Western powers, but the risk of forcefully having to engage the military might of the 
U.S. should be enough to warrant a change of policy on the part of the Syrian regime. 
On the face of it, not complying with the demands that are made of Syria with regards 
to the support of foreign militant groups may indicate, if not outright irrationality, 
then surely a failure in perception.  
Syria under Bashar al-Assad, however, has not made any attempt at all to make 
amends with the U.S. or the U.N. with regards to the Hezbollah2. Although its 
relationship with Lebanon changed dramatically during spring 2005, it was moved as 
much by the increasingly untenable situation within Lebanon as any measure of 
foreign pressure. On the contrary, the regime has reiterated its position that it regards 
the Hezbollah as a legitimate resistance organization and that its relationship with 
Lebanon is a bilateral affair of no concern to the international community. Syria’s 
                                              
2 UNSCR 1559 demands calls for the disbandment of all militias in Lebanon without mentioning Hezbollah specifically. 
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standard response to questions of when they would pull out of Lebanon was that any 
pull-out from Lebanon would have to be part of an agreement that would entail the 
end of Israeli occupation of all Arab lands (Ghattas 15.9.2004). Indeed, as late as 
September 2004 Damascus blatantly intervened to extend the term of pro-Syrian 
Lebanese President Emile Lahoud (BBC 3.9.2004) against the wishes of the U.S. and 
the U.N. Nonetheless, during the spring of 2005 Syria pulled out its troops from 
Lebanon. Even so, there are persistent accusations Syrian intelligence and security 
services are still active in Lebanon, and pro-Syrian politicians are still in positions of 
influence in the Lebanese government. Significantly, pro-Syrian president Emile 
Lahoud is still in power despite accusations that parliamentarians were coerced into 
amending the constitution allowing for the extension of his presidency by three years 
in 2004. The reversal of this decision is stymied by the minority alliance of the Shiite 
parties the Hezbollah and Amal, in collusion with former general Michel Aoun’s Free 
Patriotic Movement.  
1.2 Point of departure 
The guiding question of the thesis is therefore the following: Why does Syria 
continue to support the Hezbollah in the face of significant international pressure to 
desist, and what does this tell us about the forces driving Syrian foreign policy? In 
other words, why does the regime continue to follow a strategy of balancing against 
the powers that are arrayed against them at this time, when this option seems to lead 
the country further down the road to a conflict they presumably cannot win? Of 
further interest is also the question of whether the rise of Bashar al-Assad following 
the death of Hafez al-Assad resulted in a change of priorities in the security and 
foreign policies under evaluation. 
1.2.1 Claims of the thesis 
The ultimate goal of the Syrian regime is to remain in power. However, there are 
certain boundaries that the regime cannot cross in pursuit of that end goal. Most 
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salient among these is that it cannot concede the Golan Heights to Israel. The 
retrieval of the Golan Heights is therefore Syria’s most important national security 
aim, the attainment of which significantly depends upon the instrumental role of the 
Hezbollah. In other words; Syrian support for Hezbollah has to be understood within 
the context of Syria’s conflict with Israel, specifically concerning the Golan Heights.  
This thesis claims that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad can be described as 
deftly pursuing the policy which will optimally enhance its grip on power from 
threats both foreign and domestic. Enmity towards Israel and skepticism towards U.S. 
intentions are in many respects what binds the Syrians together. These are not 
contentious issues. However, this thesis contends that the regime does not need to 
conjure up external threats to deflect more serious domestic threats, that the regime is 
not under pressure from domestic sources to such a degree that it stymies a rational 
foreign policy. This implies that the policies of the regime are not under the spell of 
irredentist ideologies of pan-Arabism or Great-Syrianism, although issues of identity 
clearly cannot be dismissed altogether by the regime if they are to secure a minimum 
of legitimacy.  As such, we can establish that the policies of Bashar al-Assad has not 
altered course significantly, as he is, just as his father since the 1990s, trying his best 
to placate the U.S. concomitantly as not loosing sight of the core interests of the 
Baathist regime. The intensified threat from the U.S. on the terrorism issue is seen by 
the regime in Damascus as an effort by the Israeli – U.S. alliance to rob Syria of any 
opportunity to balance Israel in the regional game. The classification of the Hezbollah 
as a terror organization by the U.S. and Israel is therefore regarded by Syria as a 
means of de-legitimating its security policy, not one of defending international 
security.  
1.2.2 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses for this study take the form of two statements that correspond to two 
different models for explaining the foreign policy of Syria. Each of the models are 
based on one of the two broad schools of thought that dominate the debate on the 
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issue at hand. One emphasizes external threats and constraints, the other highlights 
the precariousness of Third World regimes. The claim of this thesis asserts that 
Syrian foreign policy can for the most part be described according to H¹, but needs to 
be augmented by elements pertaining to H² in order to fill in content to the aims of 
the regime that are exogenous to pure power-balancing behavior.  
Model I 
Hypothesis 
H¹: Syrian support for the Hezbollah can be explained by the instrumental role the 
Hezbollah serves in countering external threats. This perspective corresponds to the 
neorealist understanding of states’ foreign policy conduct. Threats to the regime 
originate from outside the state, and often in the course of shifts in the structure of the 
distribution of power in the system of which it is a part.  
Predictions 
Alliance with Iran 
The hypothesis predicts that Syria will align with Iran, manifested in support for the 
Hezbollah, to counter the threat that is posed to Syria by Israel. The establishment of 
the Hezbollah was in its day to a large extent the result of efforts by agents of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the tenets of the Iranian revolution was that it must 
be exported across the world. The one place in which they achieved a measure of 
success was among the dispossessed and radicalized Shiite population of Lebanon. 
By facilitating the works of followers of the Iranian Ayatollah in Lebanon, Syria 
ensures good relations with Iran as a badly needed friend in an increasingly hostile 
environment. In a strategic situation with enemies on all sides Syria can ill afford to 
estrange a close ally, and will therefore continue this policy.    
Regaining the Golan Heights  
By controlling the warfare of the Hezbollah, Syria can pressure Israel to heed Syrian 
claims on the Golan Heights-issue without having to take the consequences of those 
actions. Directly confronting its prime adversary, Israel, would be virtually suicidal. 
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Since there is a large gap between what it perceives to be its security needs, and the 
resources it has at its disposal, it has to be creative in the manner in which it goes 
about attaining those goals. Discreetly supporting a militia that is a substantial threat 
to Israeli security is an example of such inspired policy-making. Although one would 
be hard pressed to claim that this relationship any longer gives the Syrian regime 
plausible deniability in pressuring Israel, the policy has so far been sufficiently 
indirect to ward off most accusations that attacks by the Hezbollah constitutes a clear 
casus belli against Syria. 
Power projection
By exercising influence upon the actions and fate of the Hezbollah, Syria maintains a 
powerful instrument of power in Lebanese affairs. As long as the Hezbollah is 
actively pursuing its conflict with Israel, Syria can continue to use that as a catch-all 
argument for its meddling in the political affairs of Lebanon. In other words, the 
continued presence of a formidable militia responsive to Syrian needs helps to ensure 
Syrian influence in Lebanon. Syria regards Lebanon as a critical country to its 
security, the subject of a 0-sum game with Israel. They are concerned that Lebanon 
will enter into a peace treaty with Israel, leaving Syria behind, if left to their own 
devices. With nominal control over the Israeli-Lebanese border, Syria gains strategic 
depth, and increases deterrent as well as offensive capability. This argument is 
assessed to hold true even after the Syrian army’s withdrawal, as it will only take a 
few hours to reposition troops to their former locations in Lebanon.  
Model II 
Hypothesis 
H²: Continued Syrian support for the Hezbollah can be explained as a reaction to 
domestic pressures. This alludes to an understanding of there being specific 
considerations to take when analyzing the policies of Third World states, meaning 
that the regime is threatened by fissures along ideological, religious and sectarian 
lines (domestic threats), more so than from external threats. As a result of this, Syria 
has to continue to support the Hezbollah as it is the manifestation of a policy of 
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belligerence against Israel, which in turn is needed to legitimate the regimes’ hold on 
power.  
Predictions 
Need for belligerency  
The model does not maintain that there are no significant external threats, merely that 
the domestic sphere contains the most serious threats for the regime. As a result, 
regimes have to legitimate their policies according to radical ideologies, conjuring up 
threats against which only the regime can protect them. According to this reasoning, 
it is logical for the regime to keep the Golan issue alive in order to consolidate its 
rule. Because of the everlasting conflict with Israel, Syria is in a continual state of 
emergency. Accordingly, the dispute with Israel gives the regime the occasion to 
cloak repression as security necessities.  
Need for radicalism  
An oft cited aspect of the domestic level of analysis especially relevant for Syria is 
the ethnic composition of the regime itself. In a fractious society that is divided along 
religious, tribal and ethnic lines, a regime must balance competing pressures to 
legitimate their rule. The use of religious, ethnic and tribal loyalties is seen as key to 
this end. The extent of stability in the regime is seen as a function of a groups’ 
control over the state’s instruments of coercion, and the consequent need to pay heed 
to demands from other groups (Kessler 1987).  
Preserving regional stature  
Syria is loath to bee seen in the Arab world to buckle under international pressure 
from the U.S. and Israel. In one sense, they are trapped by decades of propaganda and 
rhetoric against the proponents of western power and values. The Hezbollah is 
regarded in the Arab world as something as rare as a successful Arab resistance 
movement, and is for this reason greatly revered by an audience far beyond its 
Lebanese Shiite base. The protection of the Hezbollah against vilification by the U.S. 
administration can therefore be seen as a matter of defending Arab honor.  
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1.2.3 Limitations 
The scope of the thesis will have to be somewhat restricted considering the need for 
brevity. The case at hand cuts across the issue areas that are the most salient for the 
Syrian regime, and indeed, for the region as a whole. It concerns the war of attrition 
on the Lebanon – Israel border, Syrian influence in Lebanon, the conflict over the 
Golan Heights, Syrian – Iranian relations, and the fate of Syria in the U.S.-led 
GWOT. All these issue-areas are interrelated to such a degree that to wholly omit one 
of them would not enhance analytical clarity through parsimony, but would risk 
significantly weakening internal validity.  
The timeframe will be from the implementation of the Taif Accords that ended the 
Lebanese Civil War in 1991 to the period preceding former Lebanese premier Rafiq 
al-Hariris assassination in February 2005. The analysis will start in 1991 because that 
is when it is believed that Syria began to dictate the rules of the game in relation to 
the conflict with Israel, and the internal dynamics in Lebanon. In short, the Hezbollah 
remained the only militia that was not disarmed after the conclusion of the Lebanese 
civil war in order for it to continue resistance against the Israeli occupation of South 
Lebanon. It is first and foremost the relationship with the Hezbollah that concerns 
this thesis, although it will inevitably touch on the other parts of the dispute as well. It 
is also a watershed year in the regional and global dimensions. The Soviet Union 
officially collapsed, marking the end of Soviet patronage, and Operation Desert 
Storm (with Syria participating on the allied side) ushered in the peace talks in 
Madrid that were to mark the start of the Middle East Peace Process. I will not strictly 
adhere to these provisions when discussing the attributes of Hafez al-Assad’s 
leadership. The cut-off point is chosen because that event proved to be a turning point 
in Lebanese – Syrian relations which we do not yet see the full ramifications of.  
1.2.4 Justification for the study 
It is exceedingly important in these heady times of GWOT to search for rational 
explanations for the actions of the supposed enemy. With the preponderant use of 
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moral terminology of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ to describe the struggle, it may become 
deceptively easy to assume that Syria is guided by a morally deficient regime bent on 
spreading destruction, ensnared in radical ideologies, subsumed by domestic strife, 
not willing or able to pursue the policies that will most benefit their country.  
This attitude has long traditions in studies of the Middle East. Edward Said (1978) 
coined the term orientalism to describe the tendency to portray the constructed image 
of the ‘orient’ as the significant other against which Europeans and Americans 
defined themselves. To the extent that ‘the West’ (the occident) regarded itself as 
rational and enlightened, it followed that ‘the East’ (the orient), was irrational and 
backward. The tendency to ascribe the political culture in the Middle East as 
inherently authoritarian and violent lends itself, however unwittingly, to this tradition. 
Despite being beset by security challenges that can be said to have its roots in the 
legacy of colonialism, I believe that the policies of Syria can still mainly be described 
according to theories developed to study the foreign policies in the rest of the world. 
However, that the actors’ particular circumstances have to be given consideration to 
properly understand that the arrangement of preferences might diverge from that 
which at first glance might seem rational from a Western perspective.  The primary 
reason for this assertion is that I believe that policy in the Middle East, as most 
everywhere else, is determined by the categories of power, threats and opportunities. 
Nevertheless, it is still, perhaps an ambitious, aim to be sensitive to the particular 
facets of the region under study, while avoiding stifling reductionism (Gerges 1991). 
If a case can be made for this, then it is not unreasonable to expect peace with Israel 
some time in the future, and it can give direction to efforts at addressing Syria’s 
relationship with the Hezbollah that are not based on prejudiced assumptions.  
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1.3 Research strategy 
1.3.1 Why a case study? 
There is disagreement as how to define precisely what a case study is and how it 
should be delineated from other methods of social inquiry. I follow the teaching that 
it is not a matter of whether the data is qualitative or quantitative, but of choosing the 
research design and strategy that is best suited to the research question (Andersen 
1997, Yin 1994). A case study was the strategy of choice in this instance, not because 
of the fact that the data under scrutiny is exclusively qualitative. Using the criteria of 
Robert K. Yin (1994: Ch.1) the decision to venture a case study was taken because 
the research-problem at hand is very much a matter of analyzing a ‘why-question’ 
about a contemporary event over which we have little or no control. Still following 
Yin’s definition, a further reason is that the phenomenon under study is not readily 
separated from its context because the boundaries between context and phenomenon 
are not clearly evident. The phenomenon under study here, the use of the Hezbollah 
as a proxy for boosting Syrian regime security, is clearly not easily separated from 
the context of the Arab – Israeli conflict.  
Explanatory case study 
Due to the nature of the main question being asked, why Syria continues to support 
the Hezbollah when it risks the wrath of the United States by doing so, it seems to 
qualify for an explanatory case-study research strategy. As Yin (1994:5) defines it, an 
explanatory case study is a study where: 
“The analyst’s objective should be to pose competing explanations for 
the same set of events and to indicate how such explanations may apply 
to other situations”. 
Indeed, this is precisely what our intention is in this study. I posit two competing 
explanations that are grounded in two different theoretical perspectives, and thereby 
seek to strengthen one set of assumptions on the nature of policy-making in Syria 
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over another. The design can thus be termed as one of theory testing and testing of 
antecedent conditions using within-case process tracing (Van Evera 1997).  
Generalization 
It is not the aim of this study to arrive at conclusions of universal validity but to 
attempt to find conclusions that are valid for a particular class of phenomena under 
certain circumstances (Andersen 1997:16). The case chosen, the regime of the state of 
Syria, is a case of a post-colonialist, Third World, Arab state that is regarded as a 
rogue state by the USA, and the finding of the study can therefore perhaps shed light 
on the constraints, pressures and opportunities that influences other parts of Syria’s 
foreign and security policies, and even other regimes in that category. That is, if 
indeed the study finds evidence that the particular circumstances of the Syrian regime 
has influence on the outcome of its foreign policy calculations. As such the thesis can 
be categorized as a theoretically interpretive study (Andersen 1997:68-73, Ch.5). 
However, the objective is not to establish statistical generalization, but analytical 
generalization for the theoretical propositions of the thesis (Yin 1994:35-36).  
The control problem 
In this case I have absolutely no means to control the behavioral events being 
observed. Control over unwanted variation therefore has to be established through 
analytical control, meaning that the limitations imposed through the design of the 
study makes it analogous to an experiment. In other words, the strategy must reduce 
the likelihood of the effects on the dependent variable in reality being caused 
spuriously by hidden variables. Such incidences could in this study for instance be 
that Syrian support for the Hezbollah continues as the result of bureaucratic in-
fighting in the regime, or that the continuation of the policy is not the result of 
calculated policy but the result of organizational ineptitude. Most counter-claims that 
come to mind are, however, weakened by reiterating the basic reality that the 
leadership of Bashar al-Assad has made no qualms concerning his strong support for 
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the organization despite the unequivocal warnings enunciated by both the U.S. and 
the U.N.    
Problems of inferrence 
There clearly might be problems in inferring from the data why Syria supports the 
Hezbollah to the question of what this tells us about the forces driving Syria’s foreign 
policy. The logic of inference in this study is to see which of the propositions in the 
study is best supported by the data, which of the propositions that has the weaker 
links in its chain of assumptions. Unfortunately, there is no precise instrument of 
measurement available to allow us to definitively refute one hypothesis and keep the 
other. At best, the contrasts in explanatory power and validity will be sufficient to 
declare one strengthened at the expense of the other. This can hardly be termed a 
strong test, and is in keeping with the definition Stephen Van Evera (1997:32) gives 
of a straws-in-the-wind test: 
Most predictions have low uniqueness and low certitude, and hence 
provide tests that are indecisive both ways: passed and flunked tests are 
both “straws in the wind”. Such test can weigh in the total balance of 
evidence but are themselves indecisive. 
The reasoning for this less than optimistic outlook for the study is that it is unlikely 
that we can conclude in any absolute manner. Even if one hypothesis is judged 
stronger than the other, and thereby increasing the likelihood of the operation of its 
governing theory, the ‘loosing’ theory cannot be dismissed as such.  
The admittedly relatively low level of certitude with which we can perform the 
analysis in this case is, I believe, aptly compensated by the relevance of the issue 
being debated. No regime is ever likely to be true to any pure model-types, and this 
one is likely to contain elements of both models. However, the identification of one 
explanatory model’s superior explanatory power can give an indication of the true 
nature of the threats and motivations of the Syrian regime. This problem arises 
because the regime under study is notoriously opaque and the issue is a current and 
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continuing one, but the potency of the information that can be ascertained precisely 
because of this fact countermands much of the criticism.  
Units of analysis 
I posit that it is the regime, or the elite of the ruling Baath party – military 
government structure of Syria that is the appropriate unit of analysis. This is 
understood as President Bashar al-Assad and his closest circle of confidants. I 
contend that the prime motivation for all calculations of the regime is the 
enhancement of its survivability. Hence, the identification of the determinants of 
Syrian foreign policy is virtually indistinguishable from the forces the regime 
contends with in its quest for survival. Since the case focuses on the regime’s 
relationship with the Lebanese Hezbollah organization it follows that this is a subunit 
of the study.   
1.3.2 Variables 
Each of the two models makes a different set of assumptions pertaining to the 
processes and motivations of the Syrian policy in question. The test of the internal 
validity of the study is whether the causal relationships proposed in the models can be 
established. The two alternative hypotheses I propose are thus different propositions 
as to what the intervening and condition variables are, and what their relative 
explanatory power is in predicting the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. Although the two hypotheses have common elements, they 
cannot be equally true at the same time, thereby enhancing internal validity (Yin 
1994:108-109). The first hypothesis states that to regain the Golan Heights is an 
imperative Syrian goal, whereas the second states that it is merely the claim to the 
Golan that is important, because the regime is reliant on perpetuating a state of 
conflict with Israel.  
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Common assumptions 
The first assumption is of course the one iterated in the research question, connecting 
the independent (Syrian policy of supporting the Lebanese Hezbollah) and dependent 
variable (regime security). It is premised upon the non-compliance of Syria with the 
demands made upon it by UNSCR 1559, more specifically to the provisions 
regarding the operations of the Hezbollah continuing under the auspices of the Syrian 
regime. It is an obvious weakness of the study, but an inevitable trade-off when 
choosing a current topic for study, that there is a pervasive risk that the hypothesis 
will be falsified by tomorrow’s newspaper. However, even if this should come to pass 
before the completion of the study, the enduring procrastination of the Syrian regime, 
to the point of being subject to U.S. sanctions and a UNSCR resolution, will still 
serve to identify the forces at play in the regime’s calculations.  
The next assumptions form the intervening- and condition variables in the casual 
chain of events leading from the independent to the dependent variables. In this 
respect, the method of inference follows the logic of backwards induction. The risks 
inherent in this method is that all factors that have lead to a particular result are given 
status as casual-factors, and that problems of interaction effects are not taken 
seriously (Andersen 1997:137). Nevertheless, through erecting models that are 
grounded in established theory, sufficient analytical control for unwanted variation 
should be in evidence. First of all, as a remote cause common to both models; the role 
of the Hezbollah is the fruit of a strategic partnership between Syria and Iran. 
Secondly, and also common for both models, that Syria is in a position to control the 
actions the Hezbollah to the extent that they do not execute operations when it is not 
in the interests of the Syrians to do so, and ultimately to convince them to terminate 
military activity altogether when the time comes. Obviously, if Syria does not have 
the ability to direct or potentially restrain the Hezbollah, the Israeli’s would have 
scant reason to predicate their relations with Syria on the activities of the Hezbollah.  
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Model I 
For Model I the next link in the chain is that the aim of the pressure Syria exerts 
through the use of its Hezbollah-proxy is the attainment of the Golan Heights from 
Israel. This model assumes that the regime can conduct foreign and security policies 
without letting domestic considerations impact its calculations. The usage of the 
Hezbollah for the furtherance of power-political goals thus signifies a high level on 
the dependent variable. In other words, that the Hezbollah fulfills a purely 
instrumental role for the Syrian regime in two respects. On the one hand the 
Hezbollah represents a method of exerting pressure on Israel within the context of the 
Syrian – Israeli negotiations, whereby Syria can use the Hezbollah to remind Israel of 
its position. On the other, as a bargaining chip in those negotiations, where tranquility 
on Israel’s Northern border can be had in exchange for the handing over of the Golan 
Heights. Furthermore, that not being coerced into accepting a peace deal that is 
considered as anything less than honorable is significant for the political, military- 
and economic security of the regime. Meaning that the Golan issue is a paramount 
goal for the Assad-regime, the nexus of its quarrel with Israel, and that failure on this 
issue could potentially jeopardize the regime’s claim to power. The logic 
underpinning this argument is not necessarily that the regime cannot be seen to soften 
its approach to Israel, but that abandonment of the Golan Heights will be regarded as 
treachery and signaling that Syria is at the mercy of its enemies. Demonstrating such 
weakness could precipitate a coup against the regime, or from within the regime 
against the current clique surrounding Bashar al-Assad.  
Model II 
Model II assumes that the level of regime security is relatively low; that the support 
to the Hezbollah follows from a low reading on the dependent variable. It argues that 
the justification for the policy of supporting the Hezbollah is not necessarily simply 
to reap the gains it might provide in negotiations with Israel, but merely the insurance 
that the conflict will continue to be violent and intractable. The perpetuation of the 
conflict is an end in itself. This leads to the next assumption, that the Syrian regime is 
reliant upon a sense of legitimacy derived from Baathism and Pan-Arabism from 
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significant parts of the Syrian population. It is possible that as the Baath regime is 
commonly referred to as a dictatorship; it might not be receptive to the opinions of 
anyone but the members of the ruling elite. Thus the case has to be made that even 
the Assad-regime in some form or other needs to legitimate their rule. This in turn 
will largely be conditioned on the degree of vulnerability of the regime, and to the 
extent that ideology and hostility is employed as legitimating tools. 
Arrow diagrams 
The two hypotheses can be arrow-diagrammed in the following manner (Van Evera 
1997:12-15). The alliance with Iran is posited as a remote cause Y of independent 
variable A,  pressure on Israel q, regaining the Golan Heights is r, while the degree of 
Syrian control over the Hezbollah is condition variable C. E is the designation for the 
condition variable of the importance of retaining the Golan Heights. All this in turn 
affects dependent variable B.  
H¹:                                                               C 
                                                                     x 
Y → A → q → r → B 
                                                                              x 
                    E 
The second model has the same remote cause, independent and dependent variables, 
and condition variable C; otherwise the variables have been changed. Here, the 
intervening variables g is conflict with Israel, h is legitimacy. The condition variable 
F represents ideology and D the composition of the regime. This lends itself to an 





H²:                                                                C    F 
         x     x 
Y → A → g → h → B 
                 x 
                                                                            D 
1.3.3 Data gathering 
In the second part of Yin’s definition of what constitutes case study strategy he 
emphasizes that there are also requirements for data collection and analysis 
encompassed by the strategy to allow for a comprehensive approach. 
The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, 
and as one result, relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as an other result, 
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis (Yin 1994:13).  
The relevant data in this study is understood as the information that is garnered in the 
interaction between the variables and the context they function in, and is in this sense 
constructed by the author (Andersen 1997:Ch.1). The great majority of data in this 
project is collected from secondary data sources. This means that the prime sources 
for my understanding of the subject matter has been from books, articles and reports 
dealing with the topics that are discussed. Each source, be they acclaimed scholars or 
political participants, are under the influence of conceptual lenses that impair an 
absolute objective understanding. As, of course, am I. This entails that it is imperative 
to consult a broad range of sources in order to get a comprehensive picture as 
possible of the processes under study. In other words, when consulting the sources an 
effort has to be made to attempt to triangulate the evidence to maximize the internal 
validity of the study. 
Preliminary research led me to the realization that the research question of this thesis 
was a prime example of an issue that had been the bone of contention for researchers 
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of the Middle East for years; could the foreign policies of Arab states be described in 
the same manner as Western states, or were there special considerations to take that 
precluded generalization? This divide presents itself in that different camps of 
scholars seem to prefer one of the hypotheses over the other. There seems to be 
discrepancies between writers that can very broadly be divided into an 
American/Israeli tradition, and a European/Arab tradition. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to extrapolate on the reasons for the emergence of two trends of 
understanding along more or less geographic lines. It should be mentioned that this is 
a rather crude generalization, but nonetheless a noticeable tendency. 
On one hand, researchers in what can perhaps be termed the conservative American 
tradition (Pipes 1990, Lawson 1996, Deeb 2003, Rabil 2003) accentuates the 
ideological impetus of the policies of the regime. Within this broad tradition we find 
researchers affiliated with institutions such as RAND, the Middle East Institute, 
Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, the Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, the Middle East Review of International Affairs, the Heritage 
Foundation, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, the Middle East Quarterly, the 
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin.  
The European and Middle Eastern scholarly tradition, on the other hand, emphasized 
the regimes apparent strict rational pursuit of security and power objectives 
(Hinnebusch3 1991, 2001, 2002b, Ehteshami & Hinnebusch: 1997, Quilliam 1999, 
Zisser 20014). I assess that the following resources roughly belong on this part of the 
divide: The Middle East Research and Information Project, Catham House, 
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, British Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Report, and the Journal of Palestine Studies. 
A development within this sphere is a school of thought on the security policy of 
Third World states that contends that due to persistent low levels of state 
                                              
3 Raymond Hinnebusch is an American, but is presently at St. Andrews University in Scotland.  
4 Eyal Zisser is an Israeli, and as such an exception to the generalization of the geographical divide as well. 
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consolidation and weak levels of regime legitimacy, alternative models of analysis 
have to be employed in these cases as the dominant paradigm of neorealism is 
insufficient as a explanatory tool (Ayoob 1984, 1993, 1995, David 1991).  
This distinction seems to be valid between writers who write about the issue as the 
subject for American foreign policy, usually within the context of GWOT, and area-
specialist as well. The Syrian regime and their actions are for the most part seen as 
inimical to American interests in the region. Some researchers have clearly taken 
sides in the conflict between the USA and Syria/Hezbollah, conceptualizing Syria 
and the Hezbollah as challenges to be met (Leverett 2005 most explicitly). Area-
specialists, although belonging to different schools of thought on Middle Eastern 
affairs, tend to approach the subject matter more as deserving of study in its own 
right.  
This thesis seeks to bridge the gap between the divides already described. It draws on 
sources form the entire spectrum of writing on the subject matter, accrediting them all 
some explanatory power. It seeks to find the middle ground between the extremes of 
describing Syria as a state not at all taking domestic concerns into consideration, and 
of Syria being beset by internal pressures to such an extent that it cannot pursue a 
rational foreign policy.  
It would have been preferable if I had been able to conduct interviews with 
policymakers in Syria, Israel, and with the Hezbollah. But in addition to time and 
funding constraints there are a number of obvious problems with this technique in 
this instance. First of all the topic is one that concerns security issues for the actors. In 
the unlikely event that interviews could be arranged, it is highly unlikely that much 
useful information could be elicited as they are sure to be mindful of giving their 
opponent any help in uncovering their true intentions. The autocracy of the Syrian 
regime and the secrecy inherent in the Hezbollah organization also pose significant 
challenges in this respect.  
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My own perceptions and understanding of the conflict are tainted by my personal 
experiences in the region. Having worked in the U.N. forces in South Lebanon for 18 
months, I have had a close vantage point for observing the conflict first hand. During 
this time, and in the course of trips to the region since, I have had innumerable 
discussions with locals and fighters on both sides. Even though this clearly does not 
qualify as scientific data gathering, it surely played an important part in forming my 
appreciation of the subject matter. 
1.3.4 Plan for the study 
The plan for the study is in accordance with the logical structure of the case as 
presented. After this introductory chapter in which I have outlined the research 
strategy for the thesis, follows a presentation of its theoretical basis, where the 
theoretical propositions relevant to the problem at hand are discussed. In this chapter 
the aim is to properly establish the theoretical foundation for the two models from 
which the hypotheses are derived. In chapter three the empirical subjects for analysis 
will be presented. The discussion will not adhere strictly to the sequences of the 
arrow diagram, but according to the theoretical propositions of each model, allowing 
for improved readability. Chapter four will conclude with a synthesis of the previous 
two models.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Levels of analysis 
The referent object of this analysis is the elite of the regime of the Syrian Arab 
Republic. It is this elite that controls the state apparatus and has at its disposal the 
resources of the state. As such, I assert that regimes have as their primary goal to 
secure their hold on the reins of power, and to maximize their state’s power relative 
to other states.  
Any formulation that does not make security its centerpiece will 
inadequately explain Third World state behavior, domestically and 
internationally. This is the case because the elites who make and 
implement domestic and foreign policies in the Third World are 
preoccupied, if not obsessed, by state and regime security, and they 
shape their policies accordingly (Ayoob 1995:191). 
Neorealist precepts5 presuppose to a great extent that states are consolidated entities 
that can consequently be counted on to follow predicted uniform patterns of behavior. 
However, we have to take special considerations when analyzing the Middle East, as 
states in this region generally have not yet reached the same level of consolidation 
and legitimacy as their Western counterparts (Ayoob 1984:43-46, Hinnebusch 
2002a:1-2). We cannot assume that the specific patterns of behavior of European 
states applies to states that are in crucial respects different (Korany, et al. 1993:10). 
The point is to be cognizant of the fact that the regimes’ objectives are prone to be 
tainted to some extent by their particular historical experiences.  
To allow the analysis to encompass the full spectrum of security threats the regime 
faces, these will be conceptualized as emanating from three distinct levels of analysis; 
the domestic, regional, and global, although in reality these levels are intertwined and 
                                              
5 These will be discussed in Chapter 2.3.  
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can be difficult to separate from one another. These threats will be divided into three 
sectors of security; political, military and economic. Again, the division among them 
is due foremost to the need to enhance analytical clarity.  It follows from the choice 
of analytical question that this thesis will be primarily concerned with the domestic 
and regional levels, and that the global level is first and foremost interesting to the 
extent that in intrudes in the regional system and thus affects the choices and 
constraints of the regime.  
2.1.1 The global level  
Core – periphery relations 
The global level is interesting in the analysis of regime security to the extent the 
global power structure impacts the dispositions of the regime in question. The Middle 
East is still marked by its experience of being subjected to colonialism, particularly in 
the sphere of economics, but the historical experience has also left marks in the 
perception of threats posed by western powers. Accusations of imperialism still hold 
potency, and there is pervasive distrust of Western powers, including Israel. 
According to Johan Galtung (1971) global society can roughly be divided into a core 
and a periphery. The industrial former colonial powers make up the core, whereas the 
countries with a colonial past constitute the periphery. Defining characteristics of this 
system are that the periphery is dependent upon the core, but not necessarily the other 
way around. The peripheral countries are dependent upon the core much more than 
they are dependent upon other peripheral countries, despite the commonalities they 
share. The elites in these countries are even closer to elites in the core than to their 
own countrymen, because they rely on the benevolence of the core elite for their 
prerogatives. 
The post-colonial peripheral countries in the Middle East are as a consequence 
penetrated by the interests and power of the core countries (Ayoob 1993:36-41). 
Although quite a few years have elapsed since the days of the British and French 
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empires most of the countries in the region are to this day essentially raw-material 
producers for the industries of the industrialized world. This leads to a desire to not 
strain relations with the core to such a degree that economic links are jeopardized. 
The dependence of Third World countries upon the West is thus often construed as a 
security issue by the Third World due to the historical baggage of colonialism 
(Ayoob 1989).  
But there are limits to the applicability of the theory. First of all it is a theory which is 
chiefly concerned with the economic aspect of the global structure. In terms of 
political dependency there are examples of concerted efforts towards political 
coordination throughout modern Arab history, especially in the fifties and sixties. The 
inroads of foreign domination gave rise to collective efforts to counterbalance it. 
Opposition forces that resulted from the instability of this penetration resulted in 
revisionist states such as Baathist Syria, which balked at the establishment of the state 
of Israel (Hinnebusch 2002a:4) 
Secondly, one can hardly claim that there are significant shared interests between the 
elite in Syria and the elite in the core countries – for instance the U.S. The 
relationship could perhaps more aptly be described as one of bargaining, though the 
weaker party is deeply influenced be the powerful nation’s ability to use rewards and 
punishments (Moon 1983). There has also been a notable effort to reduce the impact 
of dependency on the core by investing heavily in industry during the 1970s, and 
through gaining access to Gulf oil money. But this strategy has proved to have its 
shortcomings, and dependency persists (Hinnebusch 2002a:4-5).  
The US – Israeli axis 
As long as the two superpowers were intent on balancing each other, regional powers 
like Syria could exploit the schism to their advantage by renting out its loyalty to the 
Soviet bloc. The Israeli relationship with the U.S. came to fruition within this context, 
as they had a shared strategic interest in balancing Soviet-backed Arab power 
(Cobban 1991:Ch.3). Since the Communist empire collapsed, however, the U.S. has 
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rushed to fill the power vacuum in the Middle East and hindered attempts by among 
others Syria to assert itself in the region (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 1997: 10-11). The 
reasons for the U.S.’ keen interests in being dominant are not only a matter of 
domination for its own sake or maintaining access to cheap oil in the Gulf, but of 
safeguarding the security of Israel. In the words of Mohammed Ayoob (1984:47): 
But this is not a typical Third World conflict, for the simple reason that 
Israel, in terms of its ideological origins, its pattern of colonization in 
Palestine, the organization of its society and polity, the composition of 
its elite (even under Likud), its links with strong and important 
European and American constituencies (both Jewish and Gentile) and 
the intensity of one superpower’s commitment to its external security 
(some would argue its expansion), is a European state. Israel may be 
physically located in the Third World but it is not of the Third world. 
This indicates that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not just another negligible Third World 
confrontation among peripheral states, but that the dominant global power of the day, 
the U.S., has a vested interest in the security of Syria’s mortal enemy, Israel. The 
level of cooperation and commitment is such that it can be termed an alliance on par 
with the ones existing within the Atlantic Alliance, in spite of the lack of any written 
pact. 
2.1.2 The regional level 
The security complex 
The regional level is the conceptualization of a level of analysis between the 
international and the state. In our case the region we are concerned with is the one 
encompassing the Arab states, Israel, and Iran. Even more specifically; it is primarily 
the triangle of relations between Syria, Lebanon, and Israel that will be in focus, 
although other Arab states and Iran come into play within certain contexts. According 
to Barry Buzan (1991:188): 
In security terms, ‘region’ means that a distinct and significant 
subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate 
is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each 
other. 
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What Buzan says these ‘security relations’ mean is that there exists among them 
relations of enmity and amity that are more significant among these states than with 
other adjacent states. Especially enmity can be a durable element when it contains 
facets of historical antagonisms between peoples. As is apparent, the type of relations 
in a region is not necessarily contingent on the distribution of power among the states 
as balance of power theory argues. By adding the amity – enmity dimension it is 
easier to geographically delineate the region in question.  
Buzan (1991:190-202) terms the security region with these augmentations as a 
security complex.  The national securities of these states cannot in any meaningful 
way be analyzed apart from each other. The complex is a durable empirical 
phenomenon which stands out from its general background. Usually a high level of 
threat/fear is mutually experienced among the participants. There can arise some 
confusion in defining the boundaries of the security complex at hand. This is because 
there are multiple ‘nodes of security interdependence’ within the Middle Eastern 
security complex. Israel’s Arab neighbors vs. Israel are one, and the upper Gulf 
region containing Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria is another. It is primarily the 
former that will be the topic of this thesis, but the latter is also of importance.  
2.1.3 The domestic level  
Westphalia vs. Arabia 
There are particular challenges facing the Middle East regional system that takes us 
beyond the neorealist understanding outlined above. The state system was imposed 
upon the region from outside powers in the aftermath of colonialism. This was done 
with scant regard for local sensibilities and identities, and is a contributing factor to 
the many conflicts that have plagued the region since (Ayoob 1993:42). The borders 
were drawn with European interests of domination in mind, and an element of 
arbitrariness.  
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This late development of modern state structures has meant that they 
still lack legitimacy (in their modern form) in large parts of the Third 
World. Defined, as they have been, primarily by boundaries drawn by 
the colonial powers for the sake of administrative convenience or in 
some form of trade-off with colonial competitors, these structures have 
not yet developed the capacity to ensure the habitual identification of 
their populations with their respective states and the regimes that 
preside over these post-colonial structures within colonially-dictated 
boundaries (Ayoob 1984:45)  
Contrary to the assumptions of neorealism, this means that the actors in the system 
are not impermeable. Identities in the region are also not necessarily tied to the state, 
but are bound to levels under and above that of the state (Hinnebusch 2002a:7-10). 
This means that the legitimacy of the state structure has been a contentious issue, and 
resistance to it has often been seen as resistance to the imperialistic design of 
foreigners.   
For Syria’s part it is the pan-Arab movement and not Islam which has been the most 
important suprastate identity (Telhami & Barnett 2002:7). The Arab nation has 
commonalities across state borders which are much stronger than for other Third 
World regions. The levels of linguistic, cultural, and religious homogeneity are very 
high (Noble 1991:55-60), and appeals to the greater good of the Arab nation with 
concomitant unity schemes have been a staple of Arab politics for years (Barnett 
1996b).  
However, the role of pan-Arab identity has declined in recent decades as the state has 
proved to be the most viable means for the organization of political life. Among the 
reasons for this is the fact that all attempts at pan-Arab unification have failed. But in 
spite of this, there is still enough residual feelings of community left to make the 
Arab-card a force to be reckoned with, especially in times of crisis (Ehteshami & 
Hinnebusch 1997:14-15). 
Degrees of ‘stateness’ 
The above mentioned colonial legacy poses enormous challenges for each state’s 
ability to adequately gain the legitimacy it requires. Mohammed Ayoob (1993:33-36) 
 33
describes this as a matter of how much stateness a regime possesses. Stateness is 
defined as the combination of coercive capacity and infrastructural power, plus the 
degree to which:  
“the citizenry identifies with the idea of the particular state that 
encompasses them territorially”.  
To manage this, states of the region have been in short supply of the two prerequisites 
European states had comparatively more of when they came of age; time and freedom 
from outside pressures (See Ayoob 1995, Ch. 2). The extraordinary strain this implies 
for the societies involved accounts for some of the volatility the region has 
experienced.  
This problem of legitimacy is not unique to the Middle East, but is shared by most 
developing countries. Michael C. Hudson (1979:4) refers to Dankwart Rustow’s three 
prerequisites for political modernity that are lacking in the Third World; authority, 
identity and equality.  
The legitimate order requires a distinct sense of corporate selfhood: the 
people within a territory must feel a sense of political community which 
does not conflict with other subnational or supranational communal 
identifications. If distinct communal solidarity may be understood as 
the necessary horizontal axis for the legitimate political order, there 
must as well be a strong, authoritative vertical linkage between the 
governors and the governed (ibid.) 
The third prerequisite, equality, referring to ideas of freedom and democracy are also 
fundamentals for acquiring legitimacy, and is in conspicuous short supply in the 
Middle East. Considering Max Weber’s (1990:91-104) three sources of legitimacy; 
tradition, charisma and legality, one can venture that only charisma is readily 
available for most leaders as a present resource for remedying these shortcomings. 
This is due to the fact that the establishment of states divided the Arab nation and 
broke with most former forms of legitimacy6. Charismatic has usually been attained 
                                              
6 However, this might not be the case with regards to the monarchies in the Arab world.  
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by championing the core Arab concerns. These are generally speaking pan-Arab 
political coordination and resistance to all hints of foreign domination. The 
establishment of the state of Israel and the ensuing Palestinian problem is commonly 
regarded as the focal point of these concerns, and legitimacy is to a large extent 
conferred in accordance to the degree of fidelity to the Arab position on this issue 
(Hudson 1979:233-234). 
As a consequence of these factors it is not uncommon to venture that for Third World 
states the primary threats to the stability of the regime are not external, but arise on 
the domestic scene (Ayoob 1984, David 1991). A manner in which this is dealt with 
is by externalizing conflicts, meaning that threats that arise domestically are given an 
external explanation by the regime in order to legitimate repression and alleviate 
pressure for ameliorating the problem. Threats can originate from a multitude of 
sources; ethnic fissures (the question of the Kurds and Palestinian refugees), identity 
based problems, unfulfilled development expectations, problems concerning the 
praetorian society, and water shortages (Korany et. al. 1993). In the neo-mercantilist 
economy of Syria there are bound to be disputes over capital accumulation. Fred H. 
Lawson (1996) contends that this is an important factor in explaining the level of 
external hostility of the Baathist regime. The regime adopts revisionist foreign 
policies to divert attention from domestic problems, and use the momentum this 
generates to legitimate and solidify its hold on power.   
2.2 Foreign policy determinants 
2.2.1 Role conception 
The topic of role conception goes to the national identity of the nation as such. K. J. 
Holsti (1979) writes that a nation’s role can be described as the pattern of attitudes, 
decisions, responses, functions, and commitments toward other states.  
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A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions 
of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions 
suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should 
perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in 
subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate 
orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external 
environment. (Holsti 1970:245-246) 
In Syria’s case its role has traditionally been as one of the staunchest defenders of the 
dream of Arab unification. As the practicality of this project proved to be 
insurmountable, Syria reverted to the purest, most uncompromising, bastion of core 
Arab values of championing Palestinian rights, and concomitantly, refusing any 
concessions towards the state of Israel. Holsti claims that this role conception has 
principally domestic roots; geographical factors, state resources, ideology, etc. 
However, it is also the case that it is related to, and buttressed by, the external 
environment. In other words, one could posit that the external environment and the 
domestic domain reinforce one another, to the extent that the decision-maker is 
constrained by expectations from both spheres. This could potentially pose 
difficulties for states as Syria if there develops dissonance between what constituents 
expect from their government and what is prudent policy concerning external factors. 
In other words, there arises conflict between the requirements of the roles Syria plays 
as pan-Arabist and sovereign nation (Barnett 1993).   
Geopolitics 
One look at the map should suffice to explain the Syrians preoccupation with 
security. It has virtually no natural boundaries, a very short coastline, scarce water 
resources, has current or potential enemies on all sides, and is comprised of mainly 
desert. Domestically is has relatively few resources at its disposal. Granted, some 
additional oil reserves were discovered in the late 1990s, but these are minute 
compared to their eastern neighbors. The economy is weakly developed, and does not 
accrue the state much leverage abroad, on the contrary, the economy greatly relies on 
foreign aid and investment. Syria’s location in the heart of the Middle East is a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, without a significant deterrent capability, it is vulnerable 
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to all neighbors whom might covet control over parts of its territory. On the other, 
precisely this strategic location can be one of the states most important assets. This 
centrality greatly contributes to the diplomatic weight accredited to Syria. As the 
famous dictum goes; there can be no war without Egypt, and there can be no peace 
without Syria.  
The origins of irredentism 
Syria was one of the great losers of the dismemberment of Bilad ash-Sham (Greater 
Syria) after the First World War. The sentiment in Damascus was that the imperialist 
powers had done the Arabs a historic injustice by truncating a potential great Empire 
and dividing the Arabs in order to better protect their interests in the region. 
Thereafter, the impulse in Syrian politics was to attempt to merge with the rest of the 
perceived pan-Arab nation in order to assert their former greatness. Alas, frustration 
was the order of the day as the state boundaries proved resilient to change. This 
legacy was expressed in Syria’s utter rejection of the state of Israel’s right to exist; it 
was regarded as a foreign imposition, an affront to the legitimate aspirations of Arab 
nationhood (Hinnebusch 2003:4). The view that came to dominate Syrian political 
culture was thus that its nationalist aspirations had been thwarted by the Western 
imperialist powers. Consequently, anti-imperialism/Zionism, and pan-Arabism were 
two dominant determinants of Syrian foreign policy. 
‘Beating Heart of Arabism’ 
Syrians, perhaps more so than other Arabs, have historically seen their lot as 
inseparable from the wider Arab nation. The notion of an Arab nation separated by 
false national boundaries has been a powerful force in Syrian politics, as evidenced 
by the failed unity projects in 1958-61 and 1978.7 The ignominious failures of these 
projects and the lack of coherence in the policies of the Arabs in relations with Israel 
                                              
7 The United Arab Republic (1958-61) was the attempt to amalgamate Syria and Nasser’s Egypt into the nucleus of a pan-
Arab state. The project of attempting to unite with Iraq was aborted in 1978. 
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have severely dampened the impetus for adjusting Syrian needs for the greater Arab 
good. 
But still there is much political power to be derived from referring to the Arab cause. 
It is hard to argue against that the legacy of Arabism has shaped the identities of 
generations of Syrians, not least the governing circles (Barnett 1996a). The regime 
presents itself as an ideological one, drawing sustenance from its pan-Arab ideology, 
emphasizing its Arab soul. This has been for the Assad regime a source of strength 
when seeking to legitimate its claim to power, considering the low status of the Alawi 
sect that dominates the regime, and the lack of support from the traditional power 
centers of the Syrian state (Zisser 2001:Ch. 1). Syria is a player in the Arab arena, 
and it sees itself as the bearer of the rights to champion the Arab cause. This is not 
least due to the fact that Syria is among the few Arab states in the region that has not 
acquiesced to Israel’s demand for peaceful relations. Accordingly, Syria has made no 
qualms in demanding special rights and responsibilities towards its neighboring 
states, especially with respect to Lebanon. Not necessarily an expansive “Great 
Syrianism” – this is justified as totally compatible with the idea of a greater Arab 
nation (Härdig 2002). Hence, the security needs of the Syrian state are 
indistinguishable from Arab security; if a policy is beneficial for Syria it must be 
good for all Arabs (Hinnebusch 1991:377-379).  
Tapping into Islamism 
As members of the minority Alawi sect, the Assad family has had challenges 
acquiring the prerequisite Islamic credentials for their claim to power. Indeed, the 
Baath ideology is secular in nature, but Syria is still a predominantly Muslim country, 
and the Alawites are regarded as heretics and apostates by the majority Sunni 
Muslims. Hafez al-Assad felt particularly vulnerable to attacks against his Muslim 
credentials in the midst of Syria’s crackdown on PLO-Leftist forces in Lebanon in 
1976. At this time Sunni Islamists were a serious concern for the stability of the 
regime, and coming to the aid of Christian forces that were routed by Palestinian and 
Muslim forces fuelled the fire of Sunni radicalism. Hafez al-Assad’s close 
 38 
relationship with the Shiite cleric Musa al-Sadr, head of the Higher Shiite Council in 
Lebanon, was to pay dividends. By issuing a religious ruling (fatwa) that the Alawis 
were a legitimate branch of Shiite Islam, Hafez al-Assad was granted some of the 
Islamic legitimacy he lacked. It stands to reason that this was primarily a strategic 
allegiance between the two leaders. The mighty minority ruler of a Sunni state acted 
as patron for the leader of a deprived segment of a multi-confessional society (Ajami 
1986:173-175). In later years, the regime increasingly adopted an Islamic discourse to 
deflect the lack of Islamic character of the secular regime (ICG 2004b:16, Zisser 
1999b). Nonetheless, Hafez al-Assad’s brutal repression of the Islamist opposition in 
the early 1980s indicates clearly his firm grip on power, and that the threat from the 
Islamists was limited.  
2.2.2 The conflict with Israel 
The conflict with Israel is a fundamental part of the legitimating basis for the Baath 
regime. An important motivation for the establishment of the Syrian state’s 
instruments of power was the perceived need to be able to defend itself against the 
external threat posed by Israel. Throughout its history the end purpose for the 
development of its institutions, industry, and military forces have been the 
preparation for the inevitable war to come. This is indicated by the militarization of 
the Baath party structure, and the fact that a significant proportion of the country’s 
state employees are working for the security services. However, although the state is 
perpetually planning for war, and its primary goal is to defend against external threats 
(Israel), it has a very limited offensive capability (Perthes 1996a, Zisser 2004b). In an 
interview with the Syrian weekly Abyadh wa-Aswad, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, vice 
president and a long-time pillar of the regime8, expressed his views on the role of the 
regime in the following way: 
                                              
8 Khaddam left Syria in 2005. He has since become one of the most vocal critics of the rule of Bashar al-Assad. However, 
his credibility as a reformed democrat is widely doubted by the opposition.   
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“Those who suggested changing and replacing the regime do not know 
the danger therein for the future, the security, and the stability of the 
state, and do not know what can happen afterwards. Or, they know the 
danger, want it, and aspire to it, for reasons that are not connected to the 
good of the state, but serve the plans of foreign elements and of 
Israel…” (Champress 24.8.2004) 
The Importance of the Golan Heights 
Because Hafez al-Assad was Minister of Defense during the Six-Day War, when the 
Golan Heights fell to Israel, its retrieval became a personal matter for the Syrian 
leader. His leadership became known as a testament to rational power politics 
trumping former ideological ideals. All pretences of fighting for Arab unity, already 
weakened in the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel, the intervention in Lebanon in 
1976, the brutal suppression of the Muslim revolt in Hama in 1982, were finally laid 
to rest with the joining of the Allied coalition in the war against Iraq in 1991. Being 
from a minority sect, not trusted as a Muslim by his countrymen, being accused by 
the Muslim Brotherhood of being a traitor and having made a deal with the Israelis 
over the Golan Heights, not actually conceding anything to Israel with respect to the 
Golan Heights became not only an issue of righting a personal wrong, but also one of 
not loosing credibility as a Syrian and Arab. Reneging on the promise of regaining 
the Golan Heights was unfathomable (Rabil 2003: 33-34, Harik 2004:29-31).  
Furthermore, the Golan Heights would add some of the strategic depth Syria lacks in 
its conflict with Israel. Granted, with modern weaponry, distance and the lay of the 
land has lost some of its significance compared with earlier times, but with only 50-
60 kilometers from the Golan Heights to Damascus it holds a tremendous 
psychological importance. Strategic depth is also the main concern for the Israelis 
who argue for the continued annexation of the Golan Heights. This leads to a 
situation best described as a 0-sum game, where advantage for one party is regarded 
as loss for the other. None of the parties will feel secure so long as the territory is in 
the hands of its opponents, and sharing is extremely difficult and perhaps unlikely.  
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Culture of resistance 
Israel plays the role of the significant other in Syrian politics. It is the rival against 
which they measure their progress and the enemy against which they must defend 
themselves. Sadowski (2002:149) writes that it is difficult for Westerners to fully 
comprehend the fear Israel conjures up in Syrian minds. This is not necessarily just 
the product of sophisticated political propaganda, but the result of traumatic historical 
experiences as well. Israel has defeated Syria in four wars (1948, 1967, 1973, 1982), 
occupies part of their territory (the Golan Heights), bombed the country’s 
infrastructure to bits (1973), conducts surveillance in incessant preparation for an 
eventual new war, and has managed to infiltrate operatives clandestinely into their 
capital to assail Israel’s enemies9. In Syrian schools the children are taught a heavily 
one-sided and xenophobic version of the Arab – Israeli history that perpetuates fear 
of the intentions of the Israeli state (Eldar 9.12.2004). Hafez al-Assad himself was 
reportedly under the impression that Israel in its essence is an expansionist power, 
which is on a perennial course of conquest to one day encompass the entire area from 
the Nile to the Euphrates (Rabil 2003:45, Zisser 2001:105). Indeed, the political 
culture of Syria, writes Yasin al-Haj Saleh (2003), is imbued with a pervasive fear of 
anything construed as being foreign, that is, of Western origin (Haddad 2003, Pipes 
1990:152-53). Another tendency is the alarmist and mobilizational nature of the 
public discourse. Taken together with the treatment of homogeneity as an essential 
virtue, the result is an atmosphere which is not conducive to moderate policies and 
the transformation of enemy images.  
2.3 Model I: External threats 
It is imperative to stress that the two models are not mutually exclusive, nor do they 
necessarily predict different policy outcomes. They do, however, point to different 
                                              
9 The most recent example was the assassination of Izz el-Deen Sheikh Khalil by a car bomb in Damascus 26 September 
2004 (BBC 26.09.2004). The operation is widely attributed to Israel in collaboration with unnamed Arab intelligence 
services (BBC 27.09.2004).  
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sources of motivation for foreign policy behavior and are indicative of the strategy 
one can presume the Syrian regime employs.  
2.3.1 Balance of power dynamics     
For better or worse, the European state system is the primary organizing principle in 
the region (Barnett 1996b), and it is anarchic in the sense that it is not governed by 
any higher authority. Power is unevenly distributed among the nations which lead to 
a very unstable system. These differences have changed rapidly during the recent 
history of the Middle East, and balances are restored more often than not through 
wars (Hinnebusch 2002a:20-21). The lack of developed institutions and norms to 
govern interactions among them also ensures the prevalence of conflict and 
propensity towards violence (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 1997:12-13).   
Within the security complex the behavior of the states can probably to a great extent 
be understood in terms of neorealist power balancing. Neorealism holds that states 
operate within a system which is defined by the relative distribution of power among 
them. Since states wish to dominate other states and protect against other state’s 
attempts at domination, less powerful states will align in order to balance the more 
powerful ones. A state will want to balance against states that might pose a threat by 
curbing a hegemon before it becomes too strong. The alternative, to bandwagon, 
involves allying with the stronger power in order to deflect the threat, but this 
involves trusting that the stronger power will have only benign intentions. Trust is not 
a common commodity in the Middle East (Waltz 1979). L. Carl Brown (1984) 
launched the term the Near Eastern Game to describe the workings of power politics 
in the Middle East. Here, the great powers have hindered any of the regional states’ 
attempts at achieving hegemony and thereby the means to organize it in order to resist 
outside penetration and rivalries among the regional powers has foiled great power 
ambitions at regional domination. 
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2.3.2 Balance of threats 
According to Stephen Walt (1987) the traditional theory of power-balancing is too 
simplistic. He finds that states balance not against power alone, nor do they strictly 
follow ideological affinities, but they predominately balance against threats. The level 
of threats one state can pose against another is determined by the aggregate power, 
geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intent of the other state 
(ibid.21-26). In his study of the Arab states, he found that not only military power 
was relevant in determining behavior, but so was political power. In the Middle East, 
this was identified as the image of being true to the Arab cause, of being seen to be a 
true champion of Arab interests (ibid.149). In this respect, Walt goes beyond a strict 
material understanding of power, and introduces perception as an important 
determinant of foreign policy behavior.  
2.3.3 Leadership dominant model 
The conduct of foreign policy in this model can be described as what Hinnebusch 
(2002a:10) calls the leadership dominant model. Here one essentially refuses any 
other domestic factors influence, other than the convictions and perspectives of the 
leaders of the regime themselves. This often results in analysis where decisions are 
highly personalized. Third World countries are notoriously under-institutionalized 
(Korany et. al. 1993:12-13), and this can lead to the assumption that they are not very 
responsive to domestic factors. This has lead to an understanding of the foreign 
policy among states such as Syria as being particularly suitable for analysis using the 
precepts of neorealism. Still, this is probably an overstatement; since even 
dictatorships need some form of legitimacy, and has to take into consideration a vast 
number of variables in their decision-making process (Korany & Dessouki 1991:21). 
Especially when considering the policies under Bashar al-Assad, while the president 
is probably still the most powerful actor in the system, the conduct of foreign policy 
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is more appropriately described as that of a single group10, the elite of the regime, 
than that of a predominant leader11 (Hermann &Hermann 1989).  
2.4 Model II: Domestic threats 
2.4.1 Omnibalancing 
A central challenge for this thesis is not to get bogged down in any one of the three 
levels of analysis. The answers we seek lay in the regime’s attempts to balance 
conflicting pressure from all three levels. Steven David (1991) writes that what is 
characteristic of the security policies of Third World states is that they have to face 
threats both on the external and internal arenas, and that these threats are often 
interconnected. This means that strategies have to be adopted to counter internal and 
external threats simultaneously, a phenomenon he labels omnibalancing. 
Furthermore, that Third World states are usually so weak that the most dangerous 
threats for the regimes are domestic in origin. David cites empiric studies that point to 
the fact that regimes in the Third World are far more likely to be overthrown by 
domestic opponents than be overtaken by external threats.  
According to Neil Quilliam (1999:11-14) this theory incorporates elements of the 
main paradigms of international relations; realism augmented by globalism on the 
international level, and pluralist and globalist maxims on the domestic level. The unit 
of analysis is the regime of the state in question, and in accordance with the precepts 
of realism it is understood that politics in international relations is concerned with 
power, interests, and rationality. In the external realm it is assumed that anarchy 
reigns, with survival at the top of the states priority list. But balance of power is 
                                              
10 “Single group: A set of individuals, all of whom are members of a single body, collectively select a course of action in 
face-to-face interaction and obtain compliance.” (Hermann &Hermann 1989:363) 
11 “Predominant leader: A single individual has the power to make the choice and to stifle opposition.” (op.cit.) 
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considered incomplete as an explanation of behavior as it overlooks the domestic 
dimension of threats that regimes are faced with.  
The essence of the difference is that omnibalancing asserts that realism 
must be broadened to examine internal threats in addition to focusing 
on external threats and capabilities(that is, structural arguments), and 
that the leader of the state rather than the state itself should be used as 
the level of analysis. (David 1991:237) 
Because of the arbitrariness of Third World borders, David recognizes the 
vulnerabilities of low identification with the state structure and hence problems of 
legitimacy for the regimes, and the continual threat to their rule this results in. The 
low level of institutionalization often leads to regimes being seen as an alien 
imposition on society. Conversely, regimes are usually relatively independent from 
the society in making foreign policy. The main guiding question in deciding policy 
for the regime is therefore not whether it gains the state as such, but whether it serves 
the regimes interests of remaining in power. And if a situation arises in which there is 
a conflict between what is beneficial for the state and what enhances the survivability 
of the regime, the latter consideration will always prevail.  
2.5 The two-level game 
Robert D. Putnam’s theory on the Two-Level Game (1988) is to an extent similar to 
omnibalancing in that it bridges the gap between the domestic and international levels 
of analysis. Putnam’s main point is that when decision makers negotiate possible 
agreements with opponents on the international level (Level I), they have to take into 
consideration what is possible to ratify within their own constituency at a later stage 
(Level II). The realm of possible agreeable results for the constituency is called a 
win-set, and has to overlap with the win-set on Level II of the opposing side in the 
negotiations as well for there to be a successful agreement. This theory is relevant as 
a supplement to David’s omnibalancing because it helps to show how the issue of the 
Golan Heights functions as a constraint as for the Syrian regime.  
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2.6 Defining key concepts 
Security 
National security 
When one speaks of security policy, understood as the quest for freedom from threat, 
one has to be clear about what it is that is to be secured. Barry Buzan (1991:18-19) 
contends that; 
When this discussion is in the context of the international system, 
security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their 
independent identity and their functional integrity.  
For the purposes of this study the referent object is the governing elite of the regime 
of the state. Conceptualizing national security as the security of the regime at its helm 
gives us the opportunity to see threats arising from both the domestic and 
international levels. The question remains, however, as to when an issue advances to 
the level of national security.  
The answer to what makes something an international security issue can 
be found in the traditional military-political understanding of security. 
In this context, security is about survival. It is when an issue is 
presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object. 
(Buzan et. al. 1998) 
This entails that, in political terms, when something is given the status of a security 
threat it justifies that extraordinary measures are taken to handle the problem. In other 
words, it gives the authorities the legitimacy it needs to use force. It also gives the 
state more general powers to mobilize the resources of the state or to legitimate the 
attainment of special powers. What constitutes a threat is dependent upon what is 
being threatened. Since we have established that it is the regime that is to be protected 
from threats, we can identify these as originating from mainly three sectors; the 
political, the military and the economic. 
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Political security 
In this sector the object that is to be secured is the constituting principle of the state. 
Usually this is a matter of defending the sovereignty of the state, but it applies as well 
to the ideology of the state (Buzan et. al. 1998:22). Anything that could be said to 
threaten the national identity of the state, in this case the legitimacy of its ideology, 
would be a political threat. Especially weak states (under-institutionalized, weak state 
legitimacy, etc.)  (Buzan 1991:Ch. 2), such as Syria, are vulnerable to political 
threats. For Syria’s part, any qualms about the quality of Bashar al-Assad’s policies 
and leadership abilities would come into this category.  
Military security 
This is the sector which is the traditional territory of security studies. The threat is 
constituted by the use, or threat of use, of military force. Not only does this threaten 
the armed forces of the state in question, but it potentially also threatens all the other 
constituent parts of the state. It could destroy the military, depose or eliminate the 
regime and obliterate the economy, and so on (ibid: 116-118).  
Economic security 
“Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and 
markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state 
power” (ibid: 19).  
It is, however, contentious how serious an economic issue has to become before it 
qualifies as one of national security. This is partly because in most economies a 
measure of insecurity is considered normal, and even desired. Because of this 
inherent insecure quality of economics, it is essentially a political question when it 
rises to a security issue (ibid: 123-131). This might be a subjective judgment of when 
the normal workings and welfare of society is impaired, or it adversely affects the 
political and/or military sectors. For the purposes of this study I will also include the 
need for fulfillment of expectations of a reasonable standard of living, because 
perceived failure by the regime to provide a viable future for its constituents could 
very well provide the thrust for regime change.  
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Legitimacy 
As we have noted previously12, legitimacy is the measure of the perceived lawfulness 
of the regime, its representatives and ‘commands’ by the subordinates of the regime. 
It is a quality derived by social acceptance and appropriateness in that it refers to 
norms to which subordinates accord assent (Bogdanor 1991:333). The term says 
something about the bond between the ruling elite and the population. In practical 
terms it means that if a regime is seen as legitimate the population will accept the 
decisions it makes as legally and morally binding.  
It is imperative that we here make it clear that there is a distinction between state- and 
regime legitimacy. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (1993:80-81) writes that a regime might not 
be beyond invoking state security for the protection of regime security. For example 
by exaggerating external threats, driving fear into the population, creating the need 
for state protection, diverting attention, all for the end purpose of remaining in power.  
Power 
Power can be defined as the capacity to impose ones will upon the behavior of 
another. The type of power that interests us here is Weber’s (1990:73-81) ‘power as 
domination’. This is a kind of power where the dominated will follow the will of the 
dominator. This is accomplished either by the dominated realizing that it is in his 
interest to do so, or through the authority of the dominator to order the dominated to 
follow his will.  
The question of power becomes crucial when examining the nature of leverage the 
Syrian regime exercises, or does not, over the Hezbollah. Unfortunately, it is hard to 
escape that the detection of this power becomes somewhat nebulous, owing to the 
secretive nature of the Baath-regime and the delicacy of the question at hand.  
                                              
12 Max Weber (1990:88) states that any regime must seek legitimacy if it wishes to endure, and this legitimacy has three 
sources; legality, tradition, and charisma.   
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Proxy 
It is pertinent for the following discussion to clarify what is meant by the term 
‘proxy’, as the arguments contained herein venture that the Hezbollah functions as a 
proxy to Syria. I will use the definition proposed by Bertil Duner (1981), who argues 
that there are several dimensions to the relationship between proxy and principal that 
must be satisfied if the principal truly has a proxy at its disposal. 1) Compatibility of 
interests: Syria and the Hezbollah clearly have a common interest in aligning against 
their common enemy, Israel. 2) Material support: the proxy (Hezbollah) is likely 
reliant on the support and complicity of the principal (Syria) in order to operate. 3) 
Exercise of power: The basic assumption in this study is that it is Syria that has the 
ability to make demands upon the Hezbollah, which the Hezbollah in turn has limited 
means to resist. It could be argued, however, that Hezbollah has some power over 
Syria as well, in that it to some extent legitimates Syria’s interest in Lebanese affairs. 
Also, it could choose to attempt to lessen its dependence upon Syria, leaving the 
regime in a difficult predicament. 4) Asymmetry: There is clearly a division of labor 
in the relationship, where Hezbollah does the fighting, and Syria enables and allows 
them to carry on. If these elements were not in evidence, the relationship between 
them would have to be characterized by different categories, such as partners or 
independent actors, which would impair the validity of the arguments presented in the 
thesis.  
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3. Domestic and external challenges 
Having gained independence in 194613, as part of the de-colonialization that swept 
the former European colonies after the First World War, the Syrian state entered a 
tumultuous period of thoroughly unstable governments. This instability gave way to 
the Baathist coup of 1963. These were heady days, and politics often took the form of 
competing for the most radical positions. It is widely agreed that before the advent of 
Hafez al-Assad, Syria was the ‘banana republic’ of the Middle East, plagued with 
coups and countercoups, permeated by transnational currents and the victim of its 
neighbor’s machinations. This led to the unfortunate events of the 1967 war, and a 
new approach was called for. The young the young Hafez al-Assad seized the 
moment and ousted his rivals in a bloodless coup in 1970 (Cleveland 1994, Seale 
1988:72-154). Within twenty years it transformed itself into what has been termed a 
regional middle power (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 1997:6-9, Hinnebusch 2001:139). 
3.1 Adjustment to post-Cold War realities 
3.1.1 Global level 
Loss of Soviet Union – rapprochement with the U.S. 
The new realities that Syria faced after the end of the Cold war were starkly brought 
home by the loss of its superpower patron, the Soviet Union. Syria was never a 
traditional satellite. Nevertheless, Syria was in many respects a socialist economy and 
state system along the lines of Eastern European communist regimes. Thus the Baath 
regime became an anachronism (Zisser 2001: 45-46); most apparent in the manner 
the leader of the state was subject to a cult of personality (Pipes 1996:6-8). The 
                                              
13 Syria was granted independence from France already in 1936, but the France later reneged on the agreement. France did 
not withdraw their forces until 1946.  
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infusion of military aid was crucial in Hafez al-Assad’s strategy of achieving strategic 
parity with Israel. Qualitatively, this never came to be, but the - at least assumed - 
military potency of the Syrian Armed Forces was sufficient to pose an effective 
deterrent against Israeli ambitions of regional hegemony. In order to postpone any 
real domestic reforms that might threaten internal stability, the Syrians in the 1990s 
sought to make amends with the emerging sole remaining superpower, the U.S., 
thereby safeguarding its regional role (Zisser 2001:48-50). 
The threat of the U.S. GWOT 
The threat of action from the U.S. has a legal basis in the SALSA14. Within this 
document is contained the most important accusations leveled against the Syrian 
regime, its alleged attempts at attaining biological and chemical weaponry, its efforts 
to control Lebanon, and support of “terrorist” organizations. These accusations are 
exemplified in the testament of Ambassador Cofer Black, Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism: 
Syria continues to provide safe haven and political cover to Hizbollah 
in Lebanon, a group responsible for killing hundreds of Americans and 
numerous others in the past. Syrian support for Hizbollah continues to 
be a major impediment towards progress in our counterterrorism 
efforts. Syria allows resupply of Hizbollah from Iran via Damascus. 
Syria also allows wanted Hizbollah terrorists, including Imad 
Mugniyah, to transit Syria and find haven there. The Syrian military 
presence in Lebanon supports Hizbollah actions there (DoS 2003b). 
The accusations are given further weight by being reiterated in the report by the 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), the so-
called 9/11 Commission. Here the Hezbollah, with explicit Syrian backing, is 
implicated in various ‘terrorist’ attacks throughout the Middle East, even to the extent 
of possibly indirectly being implicated in the 9/11 attacks through possible 
association with al-Qaeda (Fighel & Shahar 2002). Hezbollah is also believed to have 
an extensive network inside the U.S. (Goldberg 28.10.2002), and would potentially 
                                              
14 See p.7. 
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be able to launch attacks on U.S. soil, although the U.S. government currently believe 
they primarily use their U.S. presence as a means to recruit and raise funds (F.B.I. 
2003)15.   
Enemy at the gates: Occupation of Iraq 
It is certain that the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by US and UK forces 
in spring 2003 irreversibly altered the balance of power in the region, but it is still too 
early to determine how it has been altered. This is because the foreign forces now 
stationed in the country are set to withdraw at an as of yet undetermined point in the 
future, the future integrity of the Iraqi state is not assured, and Iraq’s relations with 
Syria still hang in the balance (Lesch 2005: 189-197).  Whether the presence of a 
large contingent of U.S. troops in Iraq poses significant challenges to the security of 
the Syrian regime is debatable. The U.S. forces in Iraq most likely cannot redeploy to 
Syria without abandoning Iraq to its fate. Bringing more troops into the region does 
not seem possible at this juncture as the U.S. military is stretched to its limits as it is 
with large operations being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would also take 
considerable time and effort to persuade both U.S. constituents and the international 
community that force needs to be applied to the Syrian regime after the amount of 
contention the Iraqi campaign aroused. Furthermore, other foreign policy challenges, 
such as Iran and North Korea, seem to be given priority.   
3.1.2 Regional level 
The domination of Lebanon 
During the 1970s and 1980s the main theatre of confrontation in the Arab – Israeli 
struggle took place in Lebanon. Syria managed to form alliances with armed elements 
in Lebanon to fight the Israelis on their behalf. Exploiting the warring factions of the 
                                              
15 Accusations that Hezbollah indeed has global reach have been disputed by scholars that have taken an academic interest 
in the phenomenon (Harik 2004, Hajjar 2002). 
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civil war-plagued country; Syria managed to indirectly harass not only the Israelis, 
but also dealing the US severe blows that were eventually to lead to the withdrawal of 
the U.S.-led Multinational Forces16 (Cobban 1991:54-57). 
The Syrian impetus for dominating Lebanon was a response to political, military and 
economic threats (Husem 2002). Militarily there was a clear need to deny the Israelis 
the possibility of ever using the Bekaa Valley as an invasion route to Damascus. 
Politically, there was a need to be seen to be confronting the Israelis somewhere, and 
Lebanon served this purpose better than the Golan Heights (Cobban 1991:18-21). 
Economically, the anything-goes business culture served as pressure relief for the 
semi-socialist Syrian economy, in addition to the opportunity to accumulate capital 
through illicit activities such as smuggling, counterfeiting, and participation in the 
drug industry (Rabil 2003, Pipes 1996). Syria legitimated its presence through the 
crucial role it played in bringing the last of the warlords in the civil war to heel, and 
negotiated the Taif Accords that were to end hostilities in 1991 (Perthes 1997), but 
since then the Syrian role became increasingly solidified to the point that it virtually 
controlled Lebanese political life completely. No decisions of importance were made 
in Beirut without being approved in Damascus in advance (Pipes 1996:46-49, 
Leverett 2005:40-45). This stifling of Lebanese political life has since produced a 
considerable backlash from parts of the Lebanese polity.  
Volker Perthes (1996b) concurs with the assessment that Lebanon holds an important 
position in Syrian security policy, but takes issue with the notion that the regime has 
ambitions of annexing the country or otherwise incorporating it into Syria proper. He 
maintains that the prime concern for the regime is the restitution of Syria’s territorial 
integrity, meaning the Golan Heights. The documents formalizing the relations 
between the two states17 were not the first steps towards annexation, but the 
                                              
16 The Multinational Forces (MNF) were a peace-keeping force comprised of US, French and Italian troops whose mission 
it was to assist the authorities in Beirut in the early 1980s.  
17 The 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination. This has since been complemented by several lesser 
agreements regulating relations on a wide range of economic and administrative areas.  
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assurance of continuation of stable relations after a Syrian withdrawal of its forces. 
Relations between the two states have since, at best, been strained. Regardless, Syria 
is still assessed as having considerable influence in Lebanese affairs.  
The South Lebanon War 
Iran helped establish Hezbollah as an extension of the Islamic revolution, with the 
aim of eventually overthrowing the Lebanese government and erecting an Islamic 
government along Iranian lines. However, when the civil war came to an end with the 
signing of the Taif Accords, Hezbollah was forced to reinvent itself. This seemed to 
follow a two-pronged strategy, which pleased its Syrian and Iranian patrons 
respectively. First, in contravention of the Taif Accords that stated that all militias 
had to be disarmed and disbanded, Syria managed to excuse the Hezbollah on the 
grounds that it needed to continue its resistance against the Israeli occupation, thus 
the ‘resistance card’ was given a new lease on life (Norton & Schwedler 1993:73-74). 
Second, Hezbollah decided to vie for seats in the parliamentary elections of 1992. 
This decision implied that Hezbollah recognized the legitimacy of the Lebanese state, 
hence would not attempt to instigate an Islamic revolution, but would work within the 
confines of the state to promote Islamic values and protect its constituents (Fadlallah 
& Soueid 1995:69). Hezbollah has participated in all parliamentary and local 
elections since 1992 (Hamzeh 2000) and has become the largest political organization 
in Lebanon. This transformation to respectability and legitimacy was part of a 
strategy of survival where the armed resistance against Israeli occupation became 
national, not only Shiite and Islamic, and by integrating itself into the Lebanese 
political system (Norton 1999:21) achieved this end, in addition to becoming an 
indispensable part of the political landscape, shedding its terrorist image (Ranstorp 
1998). Part of the reason for the success of this strategy could be that the 
organization, contrary to popular belief, is not merely reliant on the continuation of 
its armed role, but has a solid communal basis among the Shiite population and is 
therefore able to shift its strategy according to changing circumstances (Chartouni-
Dubarry 1996).  
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The mechanics of attrition 
During the 1990s the Hezbollah attacked the positions of the Israeli Defense Forces 
and its Lebanese proxy, the South Lebanon Army18, on a daily basis. The attacks 
were for the most part a combination of mortar and rocket assaults resulting in few 
casualties. With the use of improvised explosive devices, famously in the form of 
roadside bombs, however, Israeli casualties mounted. Israeli retaliation for any 
attacks on its forces was customarily sustained shelling with heavy artillery and 
aircraft against suspected firing points (Jaber 1997: 38-42). The mechanics of 
attrition on the battlefield of South Lebanon were largely based on a balance of terror 
(Gambill 1998); knowledge in the respective camps of what the capabilities of the 
rival were, and an understanding that none of them really wanted an all-out 
conflagration (Hirst 1999). Whether retaliatory or preemptive, if Israeli shelling 
caused civilian casualties the response from Hezbollah was more often than not the 
launching of Katyusha rockets against Israeli towns (Murden 2000). In this manner 
the rules of the game were at times breached, and the violence spiraled out of control. 
The most serious and infamous such incidents were the Israeli Operation 
Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996.  
Hezbollah managed to greatly enhance its credibility as a national resistance 
movement by the use of its own media outlets, most important among them the al-
Manar (The beacon) television station (Jorisch 2004), available all over the world on 
satellite. By filming its operations, giving its own news broadcasts, interspersed with 
unabashed propaganda, it won respect and admiration for successfully punishing the 
military might of Israel. This made it all the more difficult for the Lebanese 
government to disregard the political clout of the organization, and all the more of an 
effective instrument of policy for Syria. Conversely, the tactic aided in demoralizing 
its Israeli enemy by beaming the images of Israel’s difficulties in defeating a 
                                              
18 The SLA was initially run by Maj. Sa’ad Haddad and consisted of mainly Christians. After his death Lahad took over, 
and the composition of forces changed, ironically, to predominantly Shia Muslim. The UN did not recognize the SLA as a 
legitimate military force, and referred to it as the DFF (De Facto Forces).  
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disproportionately less trained and equipped enemy across the world (Ranstorp 
1998). 
Hezbollah prevails 
Over time this became a considerable burden for Israeli politicians who had to face 
ever increasing demands that the troops be pulled out (Arian 1999). The dilemma for 
Israeli politicians was that they seemed to be trapped by earlier statements as to the 
virtue of the so-called ‘security zone’. In effect it amounted to no more than an ‘in-
security zone’ (Norton & Schwedler 1993). The vast majority of IDF losses were 
incurred on Lebanese soil, and the zone itself, meant to function as a buffer, did not 
hinder the Hezbollah from launching rockets into Israel when they chose to do so. 
Pressure for a withdrawal of Israeli forces started to increase, not just from the peace 
movement, but also from retired military personnel, whom questioned the validity of 
the Israeli government argument for remaining in Lebanon. The harshness of the 
Israeli conduct in fighting the resistance served to undermine support for the 
governments’ policies in Israel, and wrought international pressure as the legitimacy 
of the Israeli policies, not least concerning the legality of the zone itself, was heavily 
criticized. Especially the Israeli strategy of creating massive refugee flows to pressure 
the authorities in Beirut to curb the Hezbollah (Deeb 2003:187, Sayigh 1996) was 
detrimental to Israel’s international and self image. (Norton & Schwedler 1993:71-
73) 
The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in April 2000 earned the Hezbollah 
tremendous respect in the Arab world. The organization was widely heralded as the 
first Arab force to have defeated the hitherto thought invincible Israeli army. 
Hezbollah immediately ceased the opportunity to make itself into an important player 
by taking control over the border area from the coast to the foothills of Mount 
Hermon, using its newfound elevated position to confront the Israelis and inspire 
other Arab groups in the region. This policy was in keeping with the wishes of the 
Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khamenei (Blanford 11.12.2000). The frontline is now for 
the most part limited to the area of the Cheeba farms, which is below Mount Hermon.  
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3.2 Negotiations with Israel 
The reasons for the failure of the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria have 
been the subject of hefty debates. The fault lines seem to run between those whom 
venture that the Syrians never intended to arrive at a deal at any rate, but were only 
negotiating for the sake of being seen as negotiating, and those whom ascribe the 
blame for the failures to the conduct of the parties involved. One of the oft cited 
pieces of evidence for the disingenuousness of the Syrians was the fact that 
Hezbollah activity did not cease during the talks. Martha Neff Kessler (2000) points 
to the pent-up misgivings and distrust that had accumulated between the parties. 
Syrian refusal to condemn terror-attacks in Israel during the negotiations, and Israel’s 
Grapes of Wrath operation in Lebanon, gave weight to these suspicions, and 
contributed to the collapse of the talks.  
3.2.1 Failure at Shepherdstown 
The January 2000 negotiations between Syria and Israel in Shepherdstown, U.S., 
ended in ignominious failure for both sides as no deal was reached. The leaders of 
both sides were heavily criticized by their own for conceding too much at the outset 
without guaranties for attaining their core demands in return. Israel’s Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak did not seem to be genuine in his attempts to close a deal, despite the fact 
that the Syrian side had showed historic flexibility on many issues. The Syrian’s had 
signaled they were willing to include security arrangements and normalization of 
relations. However, Barak was concerned by polls showing the Israeli public was 
opposed to withdrawal from the Golan (Bishara 1.2.2000). Hafez al-Assad was under 
the impression that Israel had acceded to full withdrawal, and consequently felt 
betrayed. Patrick Seale (2000) maintains that Israel had in fact conceded that the 
Golan was Syrian, but that the package that Israel required for final agreement was 
not agreed upon. The U.S. President Bill Clinton made a last-ditch effort to persuade 
Hafez al-Assad to continue talks in Geneva in March 2000. The U.S. proposal was a 
revised Israeli position giving most of the Golan back to Syria, but exempting access 
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to Lake Kinneret, a key Syrian demand. Assad was outraged and refused the proposal 
(ICG 2004a:1-2, Zisser 2001:124-126). 
3.2.2 Strategic decision for peace 
Hafez al-Assad had, as we have seen, been the most uncompromising element of the 
steadfastness front ever since he took power. His Arabist credentials were an 
important part of his regional stature, and he could ill afford to put this commodity at 
risk in the twilight years of his reign. However, he realized that peace with Israel was 
bound to come piecemeal through numerous bilateral agreements (al-Asad & Seale 
1993).When the Americans came to leak the provisions of the plan, where Syria 
would normalize relations if Israel withdrew to the 1967 border, Assad was chided by 
his own for abandoning his uncompromising stance (Siegman 2000). The Israeli 
Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, was aware of the political value of Assad’s reputation, 
but had an interest in letting the Israeli public know the to lengths to which Assad 
apparently was willing to go to reach an accommodation in order to convince his 
constituents that peace was feasible (Perlmutter 2000).  
This turn of events caused speculation as to the genuine will of the Syrians to 
contemplate peace with Israel. Along with increased attacks by the Hezbollah against 
Israeli forces in South Lebanon, which the Israelis attribute to the Syrians, there was 
increased skepticism centering on the possibility of the Syrians only wanting to let 
the talks continue for their own sake, thereby maintaining the status quo, and their 
regional position (Ben-Ahron 2000). Pipes (8.1.1996) maintains that Hafez al-
Assad’s decision to enter into negotiations in the first place was an attempt to 
improve relations with Washington, not Tel-Aviv. While being seen as making an 
attempt to better relations with Israel, Syria can continue its alliance with Iran and 
pursue its regional ambitions unhindered.  
Since then, Bashar al-Assad has signaled that he is willing to resume negotiations 
with Israel (Alon & Ashkenazi 7.9.2004, Rød-Larsen 5.1.2005, Lesch 2005:173-
175). He has stated that he is ready to resume negotiations with Israel without 
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preconditions, and has dropped previous demands that the talks be contingent upon 
agreements being achieved between the Israelis and Palestinians (AP 7.10.2004).  It 
has emerged that Syria has amended the Baath party platform to include peace with 
Israel as a strategic objective, but the Israelis remain skeptical to Syrian intentions as 
long as Hezbollah continues to pose a danger to their security and the Syrian media is 
unrelenting in its anti-Israeli propaganda (JP 16.10.2004). The current Israeli 
government has made it clear that it is committed to a strategic objective of peace 
with Syria, but that no negotiations will take place while Syria continues to support 
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian rejectionists in Damascus (AP 11.10.2004), 
despite statements from top Israeli soldiers to the effect of rescinding the military 
rational for continued occupation of the Golan Heights (Schiff 16.8.2004). 
3.3 The domestic scene  
3.3.1 The succession 
The self-evident problem with a rule based to such a great extent on the personal 
attributes and legitimacy of one person is; what happens when he dies? This problem 
was pre-empted by Hafez al-Assad by grooming his son Bashar al-Assad for the 
smooth succession of power after his death (Lesch 2005: Ch. 4)19. In the event, 
Bashar al-Assad became the heir apparent, was given rapidly increasing 
responsibilities in the running of state affairs, and Hafez al-Assad reshuffled the 
security establishment to ensure no other contenders emerged. An example of this 
was the infusion of a fresh cadre of young officers into the armed forces (Zisser 
1999a:11-12). Even though the top-ranks of officers still are of the same generation 
as the Hafez al-Assad generation, this signals that the role of the armed forces is still 
                                              
19 Bashar al-Assad’s older brother Basil al-Assad was Hafez al-Assad’s first choice, but he died in a traffic accident before 
he was formally appointed as successor. 
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one of a ‘praetorian guard’ where the best and brightest are to be harnessed into 
leaders of the future.    
Despite common assertions about the regime of Bashar al-Assad being in the grip of 
the so-called “old guard” of Alawi security barons of his fathers’ generation, Bashar 
al-Assad has rejuvenated much of the old regime with new talent. This transformation 
has taken place in all the Presidents sources of power; the Party, the military, and the 
security services. He also draws on his father’s legacy, on the role of the presidency 
itself, his position in the Alawi community, and also from being seen as being of the 
generation of the future. He has built a reputation of being in tune with modern times, 
of understanding new technology, globalization, and therefore being the one poised 
to take Syria into the future (Perthes 2004a: 87-98, Perthes 2004b:8-11).  
3.3.2 Domestic reforms 
Initially the reforms in Syria were a direct response to the new challenges of the post 
Cold-War era. Contending with the lack of oil-rent form the Gulf and the removal of 
the Soviet umbrella, Syria needed to expand the sources of economic security (Plaut 
1999). Reforms were initiated to loosen government ownership of trade and industry, 
and to attract foreign tourism and investments. This was done by liberalizing 
ownership of banking and foreign exchange, encouraging foreign investment, 
relaxing rent control, and increasing autonomy of state owned enterprises (Perthes 
2004a:99-103, ICG 2004b:7, Ghattas 28.9.2004). at the same time as to reassure the 
vested power interests in the party and security establishment that their positions were 
secure, and that they would benefit from the new policy (Pipes 1996:19-23, 
Kanovsky 1997). This policy, together with the improved investment climate 
following the Peace Process, generated considerable short-term growth for the Syrian 
economy. The main benefactors from this growth were the Sunni urban elite. 
The ‘Damascus Spring’ turns to winter 
The political opening that followed in the wake of the economic reforms was soon 
brought to a halt. Once again the government imposed strict regulations for political 
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activity, censorship was tightened, and Baath party members all around the country 
came forth with accusations towards those whom dared to criticize the government of 
being collaborators with enemies of the state (Perthes 2004a:103-108, Blanford 
30.9.2003, ICG 2004b:7-8). According to Amnesty International (Amnesty 
International Report 2004), the security services still abduct and harass Syrians on 
political and consciousness grounds. The media and judicial systems are still far form 




4.1 Model I: The Great Game for the Levant 
4.1.1 The rational actor extraordinaire 
Hafez al-Assad was one of the most prominent political figures of the late twentieth 
century. He commanded immense admiration among his countrymen, and grudging 
respect among his enemies. He gained a fierce reputation as a negotiator, tactician, 
and strategist. His personal charm impressed foreign leaders, but belied the brute 
authority he was capable of exercising domestically when necessary (Rabinovich 
1998:50-53). The regime of late President Hafez al-Assad is in many respects the 
epitome of the independent rational actor as understood in the realist school of 
international relations. Ever since Assad came to power the recovery of the losses of 
the 1967 war has been the paramount goal of the Syrian state. It has been assumed 
that Hafez al-Assad himself had a realist understanding of international relations, and 
sought to maximize Syria’s power potential in order to balance that of Israel 
(Quilliam 1999:27). Assad’s attempt to build an alliance with the other Arab regimes 
in the Levant (Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians) was more a product of the 
realization of the weakness of the Arabs relative to Israel than an effort to revive the 
concept of Greater Syria. The purpose was to build some measure of Arab unity to 
the extent it would balance against the power of Israel (Rabil 2003:45-46, Leverett 
2005:37-39).  
Regime survival 
The core aspiration of the regime, irrespective of its stated aim, has always been the 
survival of the regime. All other considerations take a back seat to this overriding 
aim. All other goals the regime may pursue are considered valuable only in so far as 
they contribute to the attainment of regime survival (Pipes 1996:13-17). 
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The over-riding, all-pervading objective has been the maintenance of 
the regime: not out of any particular responsibility to the populace at 
large, not in the service of any particular grand vision, but simply as an 
end in itself (George 2003:9). 
It is the position of Ehteshami & Hinnebusch (1997:ch.4) that the Syrian regime is 
sufficiently unobstructed by domestic constraints to warrant a reading of its foreign 
policy as approximating that of the rational actor. What characterizes Syrian foreign 
policy is that it is the pursuit of clearly defined goals; reclaiming occupied territory, 
maintaining spheres of influence, and deterring enemies of the state, not being bound 
by ideology and irredentism (Melhem 1997:4). The goals of the regime have been 
consistent over time, and scaled down relative to the radicalism of the pre-Hafez al-
Assad era. No longer is the eradication of Israel and a de facto unification of the  
Arab states on the agenda, but reclaiming the Syrian territory occupied by Israel and 
the containment of Israel’s influence in the region is likely to be the main objectives 
until they are obtained.  
Realpolitik 
Arabism and the need to restore national and personal pride are undoubtedly 
important security policy determinants, but pragmatism has been the guiding 
principle since Hafez al-Assad took power. For Hafez al-Assad, structural 
considerations have been the salient factor, meaning Syria’s relative material strength 
to its main rival, Israel. Although Hafez al-Assad demonstrated a preference for 
secularism, in accordance with Baathism, he did not shy away from working closely 
with both Saudi Arabia and Iran when it was considered advantageous to do so. He 
was driven solely by an appreciation of realpolitik; pan-Arabism and pan-Syrianism 
have both failed to capture the clear calculus that has guided Syrian security policy 
(Sadowski 2002:151, Kessler 2000:70). Nevertheless, even the Assad regime sought 
to root its foreign policy within the framework of its worldview, which was at its core 
of Arab hue (Zisser 2001:69).  
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4.1.2 Alliance with Iran 
Syria’s close relations with the clergy of the Islamic republic of Iran stems from the 
days of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), when Arab Syria took the Persian side against 
the Arab state of Iraq. This decision was very costly to the Arab credentials of Hafez 
al-Assad in the region, but it made perfect sense from a power-politics point of view. 
This relation enhanced Syria’s standing later when it functioned as arbiter in the 
reconciliation process between Iran and the Gulf-states. It was further cemented when 
Syria accepted Iranian support for the establishment of the Hezbollah organization in 
Lebanon, where a special role as anti-Israeli militia was reserved for Hezbollah in the 
aftermath of the Lebanese civil war, with the clear intent to exert pressure on Israel 
on behalf of Syria and Iran (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 1997:116-138, Ranstorp 1997: 
Ch. 4, Harik 2004: Ch 2). The maintenance of this alliance became a priority not least 
because of the need to counter the threat posed by the newly formed alliance between 
Israel and Turkey20. Syria was now surrounded by enemies, and was grateful for all 
the assistance it could possibly get, irrespective of the fact that the two states were on 
the opposing ends of the political spectrum in the Middle East (Rabil 2003:181-182, 
Zimmerman 2004, Haeri 8.10.2004).  
The core unifying factor between Syria and Iran was the understanding that Israel had 
to be contained. Bolstering and facilitating the actions of Hezbollah became a prized 
asset for curtailing the American – Israeli attempts at domination of the region. For 
Syria, the prospect of a Lebanon sympathetic to Israeli and U.S. interests was an 
untenable prospect. Thus, Syria had the means of exerting pressure on Israel, while 
Iran, in addition to having a stake in the Arab – Israeli conflict, also had a means of 
disseminating its particular brand of political Islamism (Agha 1996)21. Of course, any 
rapprochement between Syria and Israel will sorely test the alliance, but the benefits 
                                              
20 The alliance between Iran and Syria is not one of mutual defense, merely of cooperation concerning equipment and 
training. Relations between Syria and Turkey have improved markedly since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The two 
countries now have a shared interest in coordinating their policies with regard to the question of the Kurds (DS 9.11.2004). 
21 The relationship suffered many crises, however, during the Lebanese civil War. The two states were embroiled on 
opposing sides not least during the ‘War of the Camps’ (Agha 1996:26-28). 
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for both parties seem to be sufficient to withstand even this strain (Zisser 2001:82-
85).  
4.1.3 Militarily benefits of support for Hezbollah  
Cost-effectiveness  
The Syrian leadership was aware that despite the goal of strategic parity of the 1980s 
the disparity of forces with Israel is hopelessly asymmetrical (Luft 2004). There is 
still a balance of sorts due to the fact that Israel is ostensibly more vulnerable to 
losses than Syria. Sharing the lack of strategic depth, Syria will be able to inflict 
substantial losses on Israel, even though they will lose any military contest 
eventually, but the prospect of the potential costs poses enough concern on the Israeli 
side to maintain reticence to enter into the contest to begin with. The other aspect of 
this balance is that Syria’s armed forces are primarily defensive in composition. They 
are not by any means capable of mounting an assault on Israeli territory with the 
intention of holding it. At most, it has been speculated that they have the capacity to 
stage a ‘land grab’ on the Golan. Considering this situation, Syria has managed to 
employ Hezbollah as a cost effective means to exert pressure on Israel while not 
putting itself directly in the firing line (Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 1997:67-68, Erlich 
2001, Harik 2004:27). Syria has thus reduced the costs of war by using Lebanon as a 
battleground. 
Balancing and deterring Israel  
Patrick Seale (1996a) insists that Syria sees it in keeping with their national interest to 
prevent Israel becoming the dominant player in the Middle East.  The fear of Israeli 
designs on its environs is a permanent underpinning of all Syrian calculations. 
Particularly the 1982 invasion of Lebanon fed into Syrian fears of Israel’s intent to 
subjugate resistance to Israeli power in the Levant (Schiff & Ya’ari 1984: Ch. 2). 
Syria thus sees its relationship with Lebanon as part of the larger game with Israel. 
This means that Lebanon cannot be neutral as long as the conflict between Israel and 
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Syria remains; it will necessarily be under the influence of either Syria or Israel. In 
other words, the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and self-proclaimed 
cessation of its meddling in Lebanese affairs are considered grave security risks as it 
could only benefit Israel, no matter what the Lebanese preferences are (Agha & 
Khalidi 1995: 17-19, Perthes 1997, 1999:55, Zisser 2001:146-149). The leader of 
Hezbollah’s Political Council and MP for South Lebanon, Mohammed Raad, 
corroborated this reading in an interview with Graham Usher (1997:66): 
“Lebanon’s strong ties with Syria serve to counter American political 
and economic pressures in the region”. 
Syria therefore regards the Israeli efforts to vanquish Hezbollah as part of a strategy 
to reduce Syria’s influence and ability to wield power in the region (Hinnebusch 
2004). Irrespective of the notoriety Hezbollah has acquired in the international arena, 
Syria believes that any acquiescence to Israeli sensibilities would be appeasement to 
Israeli occupation, and would thus be highly detrimental to its interests.   
Hafez al-Assad’s abandonment of the goal of strategic parity with Israel gave way to 
the notion of comprehensive peace only because it was considered the only way to 
stop Israel from picking off the Arabs one by one. Until that comprehensive 
agreement materializes, retaining the power of the Hezbollah is paramount in Syria’s 
deterrence- and negotiation strategy (Seale 1996b). A further factor underscoring this 
point is the obviously weak position of Syria in its regional environment. When Israel 
launched retaliatory air raids inside the territory of Syria itself in October 2003, it was 
with the blessing of the Bush-administration. The weakened state of the Syrian 
regional posture is evident in the weak responses of the Syrians to the air-assaults. 
Despite the fact that a blatant military strike against their sovereign territory there 
were really no expectations of Syria retaliating. To do so while sandwiched between 
Israel and the regime-toppling might of the U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq would be 
highly unadvisable (Siegman 15.10.2003). 
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4.1.4 Political benefits of support for Hezbollah 
The ‘resistance card’  
The purpose of Syrian influence in Lebanon is not just keeping the Israelis out, but as 
a means for retaining the ‘resistance card’, the support of Hezbollah, as a means of 
exerting pressure and of deterrence (Blanford 14.9.2004). By establishing a clear link 
to the issue of the Golan Heights the Israelis know they will never have security on 
the Northern border until they vacate all land occupied during the 1967 War (Norton 
&Schwedler 1993:76-77, Roumani 23.9.2004). Syria calculates that not only is the 
capability by Hezbollah to inflict damage on Israel its most important deterrent 
against possible Israeli attack, but it is the best asset it can bring to bear on the Israelis 
to release the Golan from their grip (Hajjar 2002:18, Harik in Assaf 4.1.2005). 
“We want the Golan and we will not surrender on that. Hizbollah is our 
best card to guarantee our interests….It is our trump card to pressure 
Israel. We don’t have a credible army or the technology we need to 
fight or resist anyone! Yet Syria is the only regional country that can 
control Hizbollah”. (ICG interview with a Syrian close to President 
Bashar, Damascus, April 2003, ICG 2004a). 
By supporting the Hezbollah’s activities in South Lebanon the Syrians managed to 
establish a proxy to confront Israel on its behalf, at the same time as the government 
in Beirut, while beholden to the line of Damascus, were not allowed to fully establish 
sovereignty over all its territory. This gave Syria a two-tracked strategy, whereby it 
positioned itself as the patron of both the Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, 
while at the same time being granted status as the guarantor of stability in the country 
(Ehteshami & Hinnebusch 1997:147-153, Usher 1997). By its involvement in 
Lebanon, Syria has not sought to end civil strife in that country. On the contrary, it 
has made efforts to exacerbate the conflict for the purpose of making its role as 
patron seem indispensable for the stability of the country, and safeguarding the 
position of its most useful proxy; the Hezbollah (Harik 1997, Deeb 2003, 
Zimmerman 2004:98-102). The success of its policy, and the failure of the Israeli 
policy of driving a wedge between the Beirut government and Hezbollah, is 
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evidenced by the key role Syria turned out to inhabit in the efforts to reach a closure 
to the main conflagrations in the South Lebanon War in the 1990s Operation 
Accountability (1993) and Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996) (Harik 1997: Ch. 6).  
Signaling Israel  
Despite reported attempts to restart the negotiations between the parties, irrespective 
of the ups and downs of the peace process with the Palestinians, periodic flare-ups on 
the border is seemingly a manner in which the Syrians convey to the Israelis that they 
are still a force to be reckoned with (Blanford 23.4.2002). With the travails of the 
Intifadah non-abating, Syria, with the employment of Hezbollah, stoke the fears of 
the Israelis of having to manage a second front. Reports steadily surface with news of 
increased missile-capability of the Hezbollah, indicating the continued importance 
placed on the Lebanese asset by Iran and Syria both (Ross 24.6.2002). 
Syrian support of militant groups, Hezbollah included, clearly allows the Syrians to 
approach the negotiations with Israel from a position of strength (Young 19.4.2001). 
By inflicting pressure on Israel in Southern Lebanon the Syrian’s aim is to forge an 
inseparable link with the Golan-issue; the fighting only stops if the Golan Heights are 
returned (Norton 1999:2, Kessler 2000:85, ICG 2002). The Israelis know that it is 
within the power of the Syrians to unleash Hezbollah. Rabil (2003:137-138), 
however, notes that this sends mixed messages to the Israelis. On the one hand it 
surely gives the Syrians leverage, on the other hand, holding on to that leverage gives 
the impression that the regime is indeed only interested in the talks for their own 
sake, that Syria cannot be serious about eventually having normal state-to-state 
relations if it intends to arrive at that point by the use of Hezbollah.  
The Palestinian connection 
By encouraging the al-Aqsa Intifadah, launched in 2000, through its satellite 
television station al-Manar the Hezbollah, and by extension Syria and Iran, were able 
to increase their pan-Muslim and pan-Arab credentials (Blanford 11.12.2000). 
Hezbollah’s success in South Lebanon quickly became an asset in the pan-Islamic 
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arena. The power of the example was all too evident when Hezbollah flags started 
appearing at rallies in the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The second Intifadah (2000→) differed from the first one not least in its use of 
roadside bombs and other sophisticated attacks upon Israeli military installations, 
techniques perfected by the Hezbollah and presumably passed on to various 
Palestinian radical organizations (Palti & Levitt 2004, Zimmerman 2004, MacAskill 
15.10.2004). Of course, the increased ferocity of the Intifadah due to the example set 
by the Hezbollah was an important part of the psychological warfare between Israel 
and Hezbollah, and its supporters.  
4.1.5 The same under Bashar al-Assad 
The succession of Bashar al-Assad to the presidency in 2000 has unquestionably 
ushered in a new era in Syrian politics, with burgeoning reforms of the policies and 
institutions of the old regime. However, the foreign and security interests and aims of 
the country are still consistent with that of Assad the elder, with retrieval of the Golan 
Heights as the first priority (Seche 19.5.2003). The issue determining policy in all 
areas is still the perennial contest with Israel. It is still viewed as a 0-sum game. 
Syria’s forces have relatively speaking fallen irretrievably far behind the ever 
increasing qualitative gap with Israel’s (significantly due to huge quantities of U.S. 
aid). The regime has sought to remedy this situation by attempting to acquire a 
chemical-weapon capability, large stockpiles of ballistic missiles, and strengthening 
its alliance with the Hezbollah (Perthes 1999:42-44), ostensibly employing the 
organization as a proxy in the same fashion as during the time of Hafez al-Assad, but 
perhaps with slightly less acumen (Goldberg 14.10.2002, Rabinovich 21.8.2003, and 
Leverett 2005:112-120).  
Syria likely still regards Lebanon as essential to its security, despite being pressured 
into conducting limited troop-withdrawals from Lebanon already in 2004 in order to 
assuage American tempers (BBC 18.12.2004). However, this had little discernible 
effect on Syria’s ability to orchestrate Lebanese politics, as evidenced by the 
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unconstitutional extension of the mandate of president Lahoud. Even after the 
complete withdrawal of early 2005, the Hezbollah remains armed, influential, and 
likely still aligned with Syrian interests.  
4.1.6 Threats on a global scale 
Perennial conflict with the USA 
There is a strand of thinking prevalent, particularly in some U.S. and Israeli circles, 
that the interests of the U.S. and Syria are bound to be in conflict. This is because the 
U.S. is in the Middle East with the stated aim of spreading democracy and freedom, 
which is in direct contravention of the sources of power the Baath regime rests on 
(Vulliamy 13.4.2003). Syria is frequently depicted as a state which terrorizes its 
citizens, uses Hezbollah to dominate Lebanon for economic and military purposes, 
funds terrorism against Israel in order to keep the conflict alive (in order to put Israel 
and the U.S. in a bad light and itself as the vanguard of Arab rights), and amasses 
chemical and biological weapons for purposes of blackmail (Gordon 2003, Gambill 
2003).  
The nature of the threat against Syria after 9.11.2001 is different from the warnings 
that used to come out of Washington, which were warnings to alter policy, but fell 
short of ultimatums. As long as Syria cooperated, however reluctantly, with the U.S.' 
top priorities, such as joining the allied side in the 1991 Gulf War and peace 
negotiations with Israel, Syria was not pressed too hard on other outstanding issues. It 
was also realized that Syria was essential to any comprehensive peace deal in the 
Palestinian – Israeli conflict, and isolating the regime would not bring this about. 
Throughout most of the period under study, until the passing of the SALSA, the 
regime in Damascus could be forgiven for calculating that it only had to listen with 
half an ear to the warnings coming out of Washington. It had become somewhat of a 
routine that Washington issued dire warnings to Syria for facilitating the activities of 
‘terrorists’, while at the same time making efforts to establish a dialogue with 
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Damascus to ensure their cooperation in fighting the very same ‘terrorists’ 
(Abdelnour 2003c, Katzman 2002).  
The threat under GWOT 
The situation after the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the GWOT 
clearly presents Bashar al-Assad with threats on a scale his father never had to 
contend with. With Israel seeing its struggle against the Arabs as part and parcel of 
the U.S. GWOT, Syria has to come to grips with global penetration in a very direct 
form (Leverett 2005:142-144, Lesch 2005:98-110). The all too costly Syrian defense 
budget is only a third of the direct military aid Israel annually receives from the U.S. 
(Williams 19.11.2003). Thus, the current threat is of a stated willingness by the U.S. 
to instigate a change in the government of Syria. Furthermore, Syria’s refusal to 
support the U.S.-led attack upon Iraq (Leverett 2005:134-142), after its 
commencement was a forgone conclusion, is seen as evidence that the regime is 
incapable of conducting a rational foreign policy, thereby affirming its classification 
as a rouge regime, and validating the U.S. policy of preventive war (Abrahams 2003).  
President Bush has made it clear that he will brook no ambiguity on Syria’s behalf 
with regards to his alleged support for terrorism. In addition to the continued support 
Syria gives to organizations on the U.S. State Departments terrorist-list, the regime is 
also under suspicion of helping the Iraqi Baath regime squirrel away the infamous 
weapons of mass destruction under the noses of the invading U.S. forces. Especially 
with Syria’s strategic position in relation to the efforts of the U.S. to fight the 
insurgency in Iraq, cooperation of Syria is a necessity (ICG 2004a:6), as lack of 
Syrian assiduousness in monitoring its own border is considered a boon for the anti-
U.S. insurgency (Abdelnour 2003b). Syria has repeatedly been accused of allowing 
insurgents to pass into Iraq from their territory. 
The U.S. has adopted a comparatively confrontational stance that accentuates the 
whip, but holds no other carrots than the avoidance of the whip. In an apparent drive 
to rid the region of all belligerent actors, whether they are states or not, the Bush-
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administration does not seem concerned with attaining a comprehensive view of what 
role Hezbollah has in Lebanese society. So long as the organization constitutes a 
hostile military force, it is a target for the U.S. (ICG 2003:4-7). Without offering any 
bargains, the intention seems to be the restructuring of the Middle East, and there is 
no room for negotiating with unfriendly regimes in this new era (Salhani 2004, ICG 
2004a:2-6, Zisser 2003b).  
Terrorists? 
Whether Hezbollah should be categorized as a terrorist movement or not, is a highly 
contentious issue that is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully delve into. Hezbollah 
itself, and Syria for that matter, strongly disagree with the U.S. definition. They 
maintain that theirs is a just cause, and is fought within the confines of a national 
liberation struggle. From the Syrian perspective, the threats leveled against them from 
the U.S. are entirely of Israeli making. Accusations of the Hezbollah being 
‘terrorists’, as the Israelis have maintained for years despite differences of opinion 
with the Europeans, are seen by Hezbollah and Syria as attempts by Israel at linking 
their quarrel with Syria over the Hezbollah into the realm of the GWOT, and thereby 
robbing the organization of any legitimacy (Heradstveit & Pugh 2003).  
4.1.7 Shortcomings  
Is Bashar al-Assad a rational actor? 
According to balance-of-power theory, the logical behavior by a weak power under a 
high level of external threat is to bandwagon. Hafez al-Assad’s decision to join the 
coalition against Iraq in 1991 could be read as an instance of this mechanism. He had 
recently lost his superpower patron when the Soviet Union fell apart, so he realigned 
on the side of the remaining superpower to draw what benefits he could from the new 
disposition of the power structure. Likewise, if one strictly adheres to this logic, one 
could be forgiven for ascribing the regime in Damascus problems in perception, of 
not appreciating, for whatever reason, their grave predicament in relation to the 
GWOT. On the other hand, if Syria’s policy was determined solely by external 
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threats, then it should have concluded a treaty with Israel along the lines of Egypt and 
Jordan a long time ago, as well as acquiescing to the demands made upon it by the 
U.S. and U.N. It would therefore seem prudent to seek explanations for Syria’s 
policies that lie beyond the scope of strict neorealism.  
Unlike under the presidency of Hafez al-Assad, there is not the same level of 
consensus among observers that security policy is the sole preserve of president 
Bashar al-Assad. According to Ammar Abdulhamid (8.10.2004) foreign policy in 
Syria is not the domain of Bashar al-Assad, but of the cronies of his father in the 
military and security establishment, who cannot grasp the changing regional and 
global environment, and subsequently are delusional concerning the power of the 
Syrian state. Fresh blood has replaced many of the geriatrics of Hafez al-Assad’s 
generation throughout the state system, except in the area of foreign relations. There, 
the likes of Farouq al-Sharaa22 are still setting the agenda. They might accept him as 
president, but it is assumed they hold more sway over the president in policy matters 
than was the case with Hafez al-Assad. Bashar al-Assad is still seen by some as 
lacking the political capital his father had accumulated by leading the country 
through dire straights (Perthes 2004a). Therefore his brazen statements on the 
invasion of Iraq23, for instance, could be seen as a throwback to the early years of his 
father’s reign (Zisser 2003a).  
Considering the difficulties of ascertaining reliable information on the inner workings 
of the Syrian regime, we can with some justification deduce that as long as Bashar al-
Assad is in fact in power there are not other centers of power strong enough to unseat 
him. Syria’s apparent irrationality of some of the regime’s actions could be the result 
of pressures it is subject to that are not visible to outside observers.  
                                              
22 Sharaa became the new Vice President in 2006, replaced at the Foreign Ministry by his former subordinate Walid al-
Muallem.  
23 Syria was adamantly opposed to the US-led invasion of Iraq, and made threats against the invading forces.  
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Is Hezbollah still a threat? 
It is possible that too much is made of Hezbollah’s threatening ability after the Israeli 
withdrawal in 2000. Some analysts even go so far as to say that Hezbollah has 
evolved beyond Syria’s control, and that they conduct their deliberations 
independently (Zisser 2002). Despite keeping up appearances in the Cheeba farms 
area, the border-zone has experienced its calmest period in thirty years after Israel 
vacated its troops (Blanford 25.9.2004). However, this can be also be read as an 
indication of the discipline of Hezbollah (Friedman 15.6.2004) and the level of 
control the Syrian regime wields over their proxy. In fact, there is evidence that the 
activity of the Hezbollah militia has been in strict accordance with the unwritten rules 
of the game, that the acts of violence perpetrated by them has been mainly as 
responses to perceived provocations by the Israeli military (Pedatzur 16.8.2004).  
Does Syria control the Hezbollah? 
As long as Hezbollah continues to pose a military threat to Israel, it is plausible to 
expect that Syria exerts a considerable influence over its armed activities. The 
comparatively low level of activity on the Cheeba-front can be seen as a result of 
Syrian apprehension to needlessly provoking the Israelis (Zisser 2000, Sobelman 
2004, Shatz 13.5.2004, Leverett 2005:117-119). Without the Israeli occupied zone in 
South Lebanon to act as a buffer, the stakes in that dangerous game has become close 
to unacceptable for the Syrians. This is because of the stated Israeli claim that Syria 
controls the activities of Hezbollah, and therefore, that Syria will be held responsible 
for any transgressions of the Hezbollah. Keeping this in mind, Perthes (1999:57) 
maintains that Syria does not wish to be dragged into any military adventures due to 
indiscretions by the Hezbollah, and have tightened its control over Hezbollah’s 
ability to independently launch operations (ICG 2002). So, the activity that has taken 
place on the Lebanese – Israeli border is most likely conducted with the consent, if 
not under the direction, of the Syrian government, even if the organization has its 
own goals that does not always correspond to Syrian wishes (Sobelman 2002).  
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Nevertheless, it is obviously a Syrian decision to continue the aggressive posturing in 
the disputed border areas. The presence of large numbers of identifiable Hezbollah 
guerillas on the border, particularly in the Cheeba-region, under nominal Syrian 
control, ensures that there still is a resistance-card to be had by the Syrian regime. 
The international community does not concur with Syrian and Hezbollah claims that 
the territory is Lebanese, and the local inhabitants have no desire to see their homes 
placed in peril in the present circumstances (O’Shea 2004). Interviews given to the 
International Crisis Group in 2004 give rather diverging impressions as to the ability 
of Syria to actually close down the armed wing of Hezbollah if it came to pass 
without their consent. A Syrian opposition activist was quite convinced that 
Hezbollah was totally infiltrated by Syrian intelligence and would surely do their 
bidding. Whereas a Lebanese close to the Hezbollah leadership was adamant that any 
Syrian efforts to that effect would require a ‘very risky military operation’, as the 
organization is quite a force to be reckoned with (ICG 2004a:14).  
Some argue that the Syria of President Bashar al-Assad does not, as his father did, 
maintain some distance between himself and Hezbollah (The Shatz 29.4.2004, Brom 
2001, Roumani 11.10.2004). Ziad K. Abdelnour (2003a), for instance, says that 
Hezbollah receives more direct assistance from Iran through Syria than was the case 
before, and in addition, has set up training camps in Syria proper. Gambill & 
Abdelnour (2002) posits that Hezbollah’s strategic importance and the support they 
lavish on the Syrian role in Lebanon makes Bashar al-Assad dependent upon 
Hezbollah to such a degree that it smacks of weakness in the Syrian regime. 
The Iranian connection 
It used to be the conventional belief that the Hezbollah was an Iranian invention, and 
subsequently, that Iran directed the organization to a considerable degree (Ranstorp 
1994). Due to the influence of Syria in Lebanon, it is to be expected that it is Syria 
which determines the rules that Hezbollah is forced to adhere to, not Iran. Iran 
provides ideological guidance, inspiration, and funds, but there is no way Iran can 
materially support Hezbollah without going through Syria (Deeb 2003, Gambill & 
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Abdelnour 2002). Past experiences24 show that Syria will not hesitate to rein in 
Hezbollah if it serves a greater security related purpose. However, it is most likely 
important for Syria to refrain from being too heavy handed in their relations towards 
the organization as that would strain their relations with Iran. This relationship 
probably takes precedence over the usefulness of Hezbollah if those two interests 
should come into conflict (Jaber 1997: 35, Ranstorp 1997: Ch. 4). 
Hezbollah’s Lebanese constraints 
The evacuation of the Israeli occupation in some respects bereaved the Hezbollah of 
its raison d’être. Having attained legitimacy from all segments of the Lebanese polity 
as the national liberation movement for South Lebanon, it suddenly stood without a 
significant occupation to resist, and consequently had no apparent justification to 
continue as an armed force. To loose its role as feared guerilla organization, the 
savior of the South, and its weapons, would surely diminish its political clout. Many 
Lebanese now believe it is time for the Hezbollah to lay down their arms, realizing 
this could reduce the threat of Israel and the U.S. imposing their will in the area by 
force (Noueihed 5.3.2004). Lebanon’s political landscape has grown increasingly 
weary of the organizations ill repute in the West, aware of the negative impact it has 
on the economy (Economist 6.9.2003), and harbor lingering suspicions as to the 
ultimate goals of the organization (Young 26.10.2000).  
There are, however, indications that this need not necessarily happen. In a study 
conducted by Judith Palmer Harik of the American University of Beirut (Harik 1996), 
it was discovered that the electoral support-base for the organization did not conform 
to the expected profile of deep religiosity, low socioeconomic status and high levels 
of political alienation. Harik posits other explanations for the expected survivability 
of the party even after the armed struggle with Israel comes to a complete end. 
Hezbollah has managed to carve out a niche in the Lebanese political landscape for 
                                              
24 Syria cracked down on the Hezbollah in the late 1980s when they clashed with Amal, who were even more beholden to 
Syrian interests.  
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itself, and fulfills the patron-function according to the traditional Lebanese way of 
conducting politics, facilitated by expatriate funding to complement the decreasing 
Iranian funds. Due to the constraints placed upon the organization in parliamentary 
participation, and the political engineering of Syria, the moderate trend in Hezbollah 
has been strengthened, albeit the rhetoric of the leadership has held the sway of the 
faithful. Nicholas Blanford (11.12.2000) is adamant that Hezbollah’s potential for 
electoral clout dispels the traditional view of the organization as a mere foreign 
policy tool for Syria and Iran. He states that the electoral politics of Hezbollah is 
conducted autonomously, without Syrian interference, and is a credible and respected 
organization in the Lebanese polity. As such, Hezbollah is responsible to a 
constituency, not just a foreign patron, and that constituency does not want another 
war. Whether Hezbollah would wither away if Syria discontinued its transfer of arms 
is an open question, but it is highly unlikely that the organization would survive the 
loss of its popular base of support.  
However, the Hezbollah is still not just another Lebanese political party; it defines 
itself as serving a greater purpose than filling seats in parliament. While choosing to 
ally with their rival Amal in the parliamentary elections in 2000 in order to assuage 
fears that the adherents of the two parties would succumb to inter-Shiite strife, and 
turning down a seat in the new government, Hezbollah retained its ability to act 
outside the confines of the authorities. By doing so, the organization can maintain its 
special status as a resistance movement, in accordance with the wishes of Syria, even 
when this does not necessarily sit well with the Lebanese government or the 
dominant mood in Lebanon. 
As long as Syria remains a powerful force in Lebanon, Hezbollah can still play the 
part of anti-Israeli guerilla movement. Hezbollah, being an organization indigenous 
to Lebanon and responsive to its base of support, realizes that its shared interests with 
secular Syria lies entirely within the confines of the struggle against Israel. Its 
marriage of convenience could at some point in the future become inconvenient. The 
goal of retrieving the Golan Heights is paramount for the Syrians, but remaining true 
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to its supporters and ideology probably guides the party’s decision more than other 
factors (Rabil 2003:77). Besides, Hezbollah is ever aware that an eventual Syrian 
deal with Israel will more likely than not include the disarming of Hezbollah’s 
military wing (the Islamic Resistance) as a key provision (Norton 1999:23). 
The Lebanese opposition 
As it happened, Syria’s main challenge to its policies in Lebanon, regarding 
Hezbollah and otherwise, proved to be the Lebanese themselves. With the Israeli 
occupation over and Hafez al-Assad dead, voices grew louder calling for Syria to 
extricate itself from Lebanon (Pipes 2000, Economist 19.4.2001, Bar’el 10.1.2005). 
The unconstitutional extension of the Syria-loyal Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s 
term for three more years created even more pressure against the Syrian regime. The 
extension was clearly in breach of the Lebanese constitution, and it was largely 
heralded as a decision made in Damascus (Rubeiz 29.10, The Middle East 12.2004). 
Following the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq al-Hariri in February 
2005 being widely blamed on Syria (IIIC 2005: “The Mehlis-Commission Report”), 
Syrian forces withdrew in March 2005. Over a year later, however, Emile Lahoud is 
still in office. A spate of assassinations and bombings since then has been blamed on 
Syria, or forces sympathetic to Syrian interests in Lebanon. Furthermore, Lebanese 
political life is still riveted by fissures between political parties opposed and 
supportive of Syria, the latter with Hezbollah as the prime protagonist.    
Assessment of Model I 
This model explains why Syrian support for Hezbollah is a rational policy in meeting 
external threats. It demonstrates the extent to which Syria’s security policy is the 
preserve of the elite of the regime, and that the survival of this regime is paramount. 
Furthermore, it sheds light on how Syria sees the issue as one of a regional contest 
with its arch nemesis; Israel, and its patron; the U.S. However, there are essentially 
two important weaknesses of Model I. The first is the assumption of the 
independency of Bashar al-Assad in the conduct of foreign policy. The second point 
is increased uncertainty regarding the relationship between the Hezbollah and the 
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Syrian regime. Additionally, the model does not capture the domestic facets of 
decision making in the Syrian regime, the degree to which domestic pressures have a 
bearing on its foreign policy. Therefore it alone cannot explain why Syria does not 
renounce its relationship with Hezbollah.  
4.2 Model II: The threat of peace 
The primary goal of the regime is the same in Model II as in Model I; the survival of 
the regime. The main difference is that in Model II the main threat is of domestic 
origin (Pipes 1990:150). It is therefore necessary to identify and evaluate the 
weaknesses of the Syrian regime, and what constitutes its domestic challenges.  
4.2.1 The precariousness of the regime  
The Alawi regime? 
The regime of Hafez al-Assad is often described as being of and for the Alawi sect 
(Pipes 1990). Pipes explains that the religious fractures in society as the major fault-
lines in Syrian politics, predominantly the one between the Sunni majority and the 
minorities, led by the Alawis. There have been fissures along religious lines when 
Sunnis have had to take orders from Alawis, considered by some to be their inferiors 
(Pipes 1996:9-13). There is no agreed-upon national identity; the argument goes, as 
the main source of identity is not the state, but the religious group (Kaplan 1993). The 
fact that the Assad’s themselves are of the Alawi sect, and that many personalities in 
the power elite also share this background makes this a criticism that is hard to refute 
out of hand. But it is an assertion that could be overly simplistic, because, even 
though minorities have been overrepresented, the regime has never been as uniformly 
Allawi as some critics seem to believe. In a study on the power struggle within the 
Syrian regime, Nikolaos Van Dam (1996) does not find that the ethnic composition 
of Syria after Hafez al-Assad took power had any bearing on its foreign policy. Still, 
it is the prevalence of the notion which is important. Marius Deeb (2003), for 
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instance, argues that precisely the Alawi sect’s need for legitimacy is the prime 
motivator for Syria’s direct involvement in regional disputes. Pipes (1990) , as well, 
maintains that through the employment of an ideology of pan-Syrianism the clique of 
Alawis at the helm of the Syrian regime legitimate the necessity of their rule for the 
continued struggle for dominance of the coveted Bilad as-Sham (comprising the 
territory currently known as Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Israel). In times of 
hardship, accusations of ethnically based favoritism flourish, and have the potential to 
undermine the legitimacy of the regime (Drysdale 1982:3-4). For that reason there is 
a fear of a sectarian backlash against the Alawis in the event of a political 
transformation that results in Sunni dominance (ICG 2004b:17-18).  
Part of the reason for the debate concerning the degree to which the regime is 
controlled by the Alawis is because there arguably exists two parallel sets of power in 
the regime, one based on numerical superiority, and the other on qualitative 
superiority. The formal institutions of power incorporate large segments of Syrian 
society, and serve the function of infusing the regime with legitimacy, and providing 
avenues of social mobility for the populace. The other, informal, qualitative, structure 
of the regime consists of the leadership of the security and military organizations, 
which is comprised of a majority of Alawis. These are the most important 
institutions, in that they have inordinate levels of real power, and serve the purpose of 
ensuring stability and security for the regime, if not for the population at large (Zisser 
2001:Ch. 2).  
Islamist credendials 
The Muslim Brotherhood was nearly exterminated during the crackdowns of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, culminating in the literal flattening of the city of Hama. But 
the Islamist opposition did not disappear, although the tactic of open confrontation 
was abandoned. Spewing a steady stream of propaganda calling the credibility of the 
regime into question, any Syrian distancing of itself from Hezbollah will give the 
Islamists the argument that all their accusations against the regime were proved 
correct at last. In the event that a treaty is signed with Israel, the regime worries the 
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Islamist’s rhetoric could strike a chord with especially the urban population. Because 
the regime has stigmatized the Muslim Brotherhood over the years as enemies of the 
state, it is perhaps ironic that this has resulted in the popularity of that movement. 
Frustration at the absence of opportunities for making their voices heard, the 
evocative power of the Palestine-issue, and anger at U.S. policies cause many to turn 
to political Islamist groups (ICG 2004b:15-16). Some Brotherhood members have 
begun to cooperate with other more moderate opposition forces, and this is worrying 
for the regime (Perthes 1999:22, Bronson 2000:100). The party is still banned, and 
the ferocity with which the regime enforces this policy can be interpreted as an 
indication of the level of threat they attribute the organization.  
To ward off the power of the domestic Islamists the regime has made itself into a safe 
haven for Palestinian Islamists (Gambill 2002) and Hezbollah. Thereby the regime 
boosts its standing in the Muslim world and can also silence the indigenous Islamists. 
However, the popularity of the Hezbollah constrains the ability of the regime to 
clamp down on them if that option should become desirable for the regime (Hersh 
28.7.2003). It is considerably more difficult for the Islamists to assail the regime’s 
credentials when it is seen as the last stand of defense for the Muslims against the 
‘evil’ designs of the Israelis. By co-opting the mainstream moderate religious leaders 
the regime can deflect the brunt of the pressure for now. The inherent contradiction of 
placating the Islamists while ostensibly working for an agreement with Israel has 
found its undeclared modus vivendi for the interim in that the Islamists can accept an 
agreement that returns the Golan Heights but does not entail normalization with the 
Jewish state (Rabil 2003:132-138). 
4.2.2 Legitimacy through belligerence 
Despite the relatively secure position of the Baath regime compared to other Third 
World states, the regime is nonetheless sensitive to the need to build consensus 
around their policies. Hafez al-Assad himself was adamant that he alone did not 
decide foreign policy, and that he had to defer to the institutions of the state (Ahram 
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2002). In this manner he sought to diversify the responsibility for the negative effects 
of Syria’s posture. It was apparent to Hafez al-Assad that he had to take into account 
the public mood, that there were limits to how much and how fast he could pursue a 
policy that went against the legitimating principles that the regime, and indeed the 
state of Syria, were founded upon (Rabil 2003:143-144, Pipes 1996:117-122). 
Due to, among other factors, the low level of literacy, the Syrian public is very much 
susceptible to manipulation by the government controlled media. The reverse side of 
this state of affairs is that the public is also vulnerable to enticements regarding trans-
state sentiments such as pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism and anti-Imperialism. Said Hafez 
al-Assad to Syrian Arab Television (2.10.1993, quoted in Pipes 1996:18): 
“I am confident that I enjoy massive popular confidence in our country, 
and yet, I if did something the Syrian masses interpreted as being 
contrary to their aspirations, I might pay the price as others did” – an 
apparent allusion to Arab leaders (such as King ‘Abdullah, Anwar al-
Sadat, Bashir Jumayyil) who were assassinated for negotiating peace 
with Israel.  
Ehteshami & Hinnebusch (1997) observed that Hafez al-Assad was not above going 
against the grain of what was considered the Arab line, but was capable of justifying 
the departures as serving the greater good of enhancing its stance against Israel. The 
regime needs to be seen as fighting an ideological battle in order to maintain its 
legitimacy (Wurmser 2000). On the subject of Israel there seems to be a convergence 
of interest between the strategic goals of the regime and the dominant public opinion 
(Seale 19.5.2000). Even those forces vehemently opposed to Hezbollah would be 
sleuth to call for the discontinuation of Syrian support on the grounds that it is not 
advisable to be seen to be doing the U.S’ bidding (ICG 2003:1-2). So, despite the low 
level of accountability the regime rests on, it can never afford to ignore the public 
mood altogether as Ehteshami & Hinnebusch (1997:65) reminds us: 
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Most important, a ‘public mood’ has seemed to define certain bounds 
outside which the regime has not willingly trodden on the core issue of 
Israel. Such legitimacy as it has enjoyed rests squarely on its claim to 
represent the national interest against Israel. This is no small matter in a 
regime where legitimacy is precarious and the nationally mobilized and 
attentive segment of the public is considerable. This is especially so for 
an elite whose nationalist credentials are vulnerable to attack because of 
a heavily minority (Alawi) composition which permits opponents to 
challenge its Arabism. Regime legitimacy would be gravely 
compromised by a settlement with Israel that was not perceived as 
honourable. 
According to Daniel Pipes (8.1.1996, 1994), Hafez al-Assad’s intransigence in 
negotiations with Israel can be understood as a policy of merely being seen as 
striving for an agreement, but that actually closing a deal is not a likely preference for 
Syria. Pipes contends that Hafez al-Assad was concerned actual peace with Israel 
could alienate core constituencies such as the security establishment, Baath party 
members, and government employees. Indeed, Marius Deeb (2003:5-6) contends that 
for the Baath regime, the Golan issue is not even that important in and of itself. The 
regime is only interested in securing its hold on power through the continuation of the 
struggle with Israel, and the Golan Heights is the obvious choice for a popular 
rallying point, without holding any intrinsic security value for the regime.  
According to Robert G. Rabil (2003:138-143) Hafez al-Assad’s main challenge in 
laying the groundwork for a smooth transition of power after his death was to decide 
whether to sue for peace with Israel or not. Rabil asserts that any challenge to the 
legitimacy to the rule of Bashar al-Assad would relate to this issue. It posed as a 
dilemma, as a double edged sword, because if Hafez al-Assad concluded a treaty with 
Israel shortly before the succession, Bashar al-Assad would have to contend with the 
inevitable grumblings of the old security establishment before he had the chance to 
consolidate fully his own hold on power. On the other hand, perhaps it was only the 
leader with the anti-Israel credibility of Hafez al-Assad whom could hope to retain 
his legitimacy as ruler after signing a peace deal. 
There have been no indications that Bashar al-Assad will prove to be more amenable 
to compromising on core interests in exchange for peace with Israel. Indeed, his fiery 
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rhetoric in relation to the Palestinian Intifadah and the US invasion of Iraq signals 
that he might be evoking Arab sentiments in order to ward off legitimacy issues on 
the home front (Byman 2004:177-184). 
Golan as an absolute demand 
On the other hand, there is an argument to be made for the importance of the Golan to 
all of Syria, and hence for the regime. So long as Israel occupies the Golan Heights, 
Syria is going to be an essentially dissatisfied power (Leverett 2005:120-121, Lesch 
2005:20-23), with irredentism a central component of its national make-up. 
Regaining the Golan Heights is not only a matter of national pride, but also a manner 
in which the Alawi dominated regime can assure its Arab bona fides (Pipes 1996:87-
88). The Golan was lost in a war to liberate Palestine and the legitimacy of the regime 
is still contingent upon its ability to secure its return (Hinnebusch 2003:17). The 
abandonment of the doctrine of rejectionism was a radical departure for the regime 
when it decided to allow for the strategic option of peace, but to abandon  the Golan 
as well is something no Syrian regime can contemplate. In the words of Alon Ben-
Meir (1997): 
To suggest that the Syrians should also abandon all or part of Golan in 
the process, in the Syrian view, would be nothing less than asking them 
to commit strategic suicide. Neither Assad nor his successor can make 
such a concession and live to see it fulfilled.  
Thus, despite the harshness of the Syrian regime, the lack of any outlet for public 
opinion, or government accountability, there are limits for how far the regime can 
deviate from the goals it throughout its history has set for itself. That there will be no 
peace with Israel until all the territory occupied in 1967 is liberated is not a position 
unique to the ruling elite, but represents a consensus on the part of all Syrians 
(Melhem 1997:4).  
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4.2.3 Challenges of an eventual peace 
Heightened exepctations 
The disappearance of the shadow of war could lead to rising expectations on the part 
of the Syrian population, expectations of a higher standard of living and quality of 
life. For the regime this turn of events could spell disaster as economic reforms could 
mean that the elite will loose its privileges as the main benefactors of the state owned 
industrial and financial sectors25. Even more ominous, heightened expectations with 
attendant relative deprivation equals demands for increased political representation. 
Furthermore, the expectations of economic improvements and political openness 
might be too high to meet, and could potentially undermine Bashar al-Assad’s power 
basis.  
No longer would Syria lay claim to a special place among the Arab nations as a 
frontline state against Zionism, it would become just another poor Arab country. In 
times of tension with Israel, demands for reform are stifled and the masses 
concentrate on the greater threat. However, when impending doom is not on the 
horizon, rule by the militaristic Baath regime is not necessarily the only obvious 
option for the country, as the population will look to the government to better their 
lot. In the absence of the extraordinary event of the state being under a security threat 
that dispels all other considerations, demands for a decent level of quality of life culd 
become difficult to supress. The end of hostilities would perhaps entail the 
termination of the Emergency Law which has been the source of legitimacy for the 
regime’s wielding of extraordinary power. The Baath regime might very well be 
aware that they will have to make dramatic changes, changes that might threaten their 
hold on economic and political privilege, if they are to succeed in that scenario (Pipes 
1996:88-93).  
                                              
25 Fred H. Lawson (1984) has presented the argument that increasing difficulties in providing for the client-patron 
relationship the regime relies upon was a determining factor for the Syrian invasion of Beirut in 1976. 
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Hesitant reforms 
Rabil (2003:123-127) asserts that stability in Syria is predicated on its policies with 
regards to Israel. In fact Rabil maintains that economic reforms and peaceful relations 
with Israel would place the regime’s survival at considerable risk. The reforms of the 
regime of Bashar al-Assad has therefore come to be known as the ‘Chinese model’ 
(Makovsky 2001), meaning economic liberalization while retaining strict political 
control, and repressing any signs of dissent in order to ensure stability. Eyal Zisser 
(1999a:18-20) says the initial political reforms of Hafez al-Assad was merely a means 
of giving a little leeway to the public mood that demanded more freedoms in the 
wake of the fall of the Eastern European communist regimes and the prevalence of 
modern communication technology. However, an incremental evolution towards a 
western-styled democracy was never intended. On the contrary, the motivation was to 
introduce new freedoms just to the extent that it alleviated pressure on the regime, 
and ensured stability. Reforms have ever since been a measured response to 
economic necessity, not a sudden penchant for liberal values. The political reforms 
were a sign that the regime felt the need to legitimate their policies to their public, but 
they never went so far as to be a serious challenge for the regime. The reforms were 
intended to fulfill an instrumental legitimating function, not as the beginning of a new 
dawn in Syrian politics (Pipes 1996:23-27, Nelson 1998). 
Because, although Bashar al-Assad unquestionably has asserted control over the 
formal levers of power after his succession, it is the parallel, perhaps even more 
important, informal system of power constituted by the Alawi “barons” that are the 
true keepers of the state’s power (Eisenstadt 2000)26. Reform would undermine the 
system of patronage, clientalism, and blatant corruption the regime relies upon. There 
are therefore heavily vested interests in the continuation of the status quo, and 
trepidation at the prospect of political change (ICG 2004b:11-12). Bashar al-Assad’s 
                                              
26 It is worth mentioning that the tension between the old and new generation within the regime is not necessarily over the 
pace and depth of reform, but one of the division of the spoils of eventual reforms (Gambill 2004).  
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legitimacy and power is very much tied to the regime and institutions he inherited, 
and has to a considerable degree to take the interests of the status-quo-seeking regime 
elites into consideration both in foreign policy and in relation to the implementation 
of reforms (Ezzat & Saad 4.12.2003). Efforts at reforming the economy while not 
ostracizing regime elements which benefit from the status quo, has heretofore 
resulted in a rather shallow and slow process. Bashar al-Assad ostensibly realizes that 
his survival as leader of the state is tied to its stability, which affects the pace and 
substance of the reforms (Ranwa 6.9.2001, Haddad 7.9.2001, ICG 2004b: i). Even 
though Bashar has ambitions for reforms, he is likely aware of the limits of depth and 
pace of these if the regime is to maintain its stability, as his presidency is still finding 
its feet (Leverett 2005:58-98). Ammar Abdulhamid (8.10.2004) claims that Bashar 
al-Assad was specifically chosen for the task of President precisely because he would 
ensure stability and legitimacy to the political and military elite of the regime, while 
they gained ever tighter control over the economy. Bashar probably does not yet have 
the position or support within the regime to severely alter the course his father had set 
the country on (Leverett 2005:27-37). 
The reforms instituted during the 1990s have served to strengthen the bourgeoisie 
portion of the powerful military-mercantile class, which in turn has been given 
increased influence within the governing circles through participation in parliament 
(Peoples Assembly) (Perthes 1992, Bronson 2000:101-102) in an attempt to co-opt 
them before they pose any risk to traditional minority based officer corps. In this 
way, writes Zisser (1999a:21-24), a mechanism for stability has evolved where 
quietism is ensured as long as the bourgeoisie is allowed and enabled to make money. 
However, in order for the bourgeoisie to keep on making money, there is an ever 
present want for more reforms. The merchant class could demand further political 
restructuring, and the logic of the rule by officers could be put into question. The 
regime may have created a long-term problem in fixing a short-term problem.  
However, further economic reforms are the only measure the regime can take in order 
not to fall irreversibly behind in the rapidly evolving Middle East region (Perthes 
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1996a). This, in turn, is exasperating relations within the country as relative 
deprivation and economic malaise is on the rise. The exploding population increase in 
Syria is a serious societal and economic challenge. The disadvantaged strata of 
society used to be the regime’s staunchest supporters, but this is likely to change with 
the rewards for the government policy befalling the already well-off (Zisser 
1999a:21-24).  
The opening up of parliament to other segments of the population is seen as part of a 
strategy on the part of the regime to gain the legitimacy it sorely needs in the event a 
deal is struck with Israel (Zisser 1999a:12). A new standard of public criticism has 
prevailed, but obviously not to the liking of many parts of the regime (Blanford 
29.12.2004, Boms & Chodoff 29.12.2004).  However, increasing political latitude by 
opening up for dissent is a double egged sword for the regime. One the one hand it 
can increase the legitimacy of the regime. The level of public debate following the 
openings Bashar al-Assad instigated was indeed unprecedented (Perthes 2004b:13-
14). Cabinet reshuffles late in 2004 were seen by some as evidence that another stint 
of reform were imminent, much due to the immense international pressure on the 
government, the loss of France’s support, and the need to bolster its domestic 
legitimacy (Blanford 6.10.2004, Gambill 2000). On the other it could serve as the 
first trickle of an impending torrent of disaffection which could wash away the 
regime. Nevertheless, a pure ‘Chinese model’ of one party rule with a functioning 
free market is less likely than a softening of the political climate with dissenting 
voices being allowed to be heard, but not to the extent that regime change through the 
ballot box will be possible (Perthes 2001:148-151, Melhem 1997:6).  
The reality of Syria’s weakly developed economy determining Syria’ status as an 
essentially dependent state has not been significantly altered since the state’s earliest 
days. The economy in Syria is dependent upon outside sources of revenue, in spite of 
the quasi-socialist experiments of the Baath party. The foremost economic player in 
the world is the United States, and the regime has to evaluate its policies towards the 
U.S. in this light as well, even though there is scant evidence of economic 
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considerations ever trumping security aims in Syrian history. Nonetheless, it surely is 
too important for the regime to totally disregard the economic impact of continuing 
its pariah-status on the international stage.   
4.2.4 Shortcomings 
Irredentism loosing currency 
The importance of irredentist ideology as a factor guiding foreign policy in Syria 
seems to be undermined by the development of a distinct Syrian national identity. It 
follows that if identity in Syria is sub- and supra-national that parochial identities and 
pan-Arab/pan-Islamic irredentist ideologies would be the main forces driving foreign 
policy, as was arguably the case from the Ba’ath coup in 1963 until the Correctional 
Movement of Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970. However, it seems that during the 
1980s a Syrian national identity took form as the former pan-Arab ideals were 
abandoned in practical policy. The intervention in Lebanon in 1976 on behalf of the 
Christian factions, the alliance with Iran when Arab Iraq attacked Iran in 1980, the 
alliance with Egypt in the early Eighties, which involved an implicit acceptance of 
the Camp David Agreements and thereby an acceptance of the state of Israel, all 
severely weakened the belief in the viability of Baathist Syria as the nucleus of a 
future pan-Arab state.  The regime thus seems to have achieved considerable 
autonomy in the conduct of its foreign policy. The existence of Israel is accepted, 
even if its legitimacy is rejected, and the prospects of arriving at a less than honorable 
agreement functions as an indirect restraint on the regime (Hinnebusch 1996).  
The decline in ideology is not solely precipitated by the prevailing pragmatism in 
foreign policy conduct. Yahya Sadowski (2002:139-148) cites important domestic 
developments in Syrian society as well. The abandonment of the socialist elements of 
Baathist ideology in favor of market-oriented reform is one such factor. When the 
revenue following from the capital infusion from the Soviet Union and rent from the 
Gulf declined, the economy was forced to open up (infitah). In addition to the 
economic necessity of this policy, it also engendered greater integration of additional 
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strata of the populace, as the monopoly of the traditional economic elite was broken, 
and was merged with the minority-based political elite. Convergence of town and 
country and intermarriage within the elite, the shared experience of national 
institutions (most importantly conscription in the armed forces), and an emerging 
common high culture, all fostered a feeling of a distinct national identity. However, 
this sentiment has of yet not been translated into a coherent ideological doctrine. This 
implies that appeals to trans-state identity can still hold some potency, even though 
the primary loyalty by all indications is bound to the Syrian state.  
As Rabil (2003) points out, one must not forget that the public and popular 
institutions which are the means by which the population is organized into the 
government, plays in intrinsic role in ensuring regime stability. Thirty years of state 
building has borne fruit in that there is a prevalent common interest in preserving 
domestic stability and not letting centrifugal forces take hold. This was evident in that 
none of the predicted schisms along sectarian or organizational lines appeared during 
the succession after Hafez al-Assad’s death (Perthes 2001:152). This state-building 
endeavor has been successful to a considerable degree thanks to the use of many and 
competing intelligence and security agencies that have been essential in securing the 
regime’s hold on power and its hold over the Syrian public (Rathmell 1996).   
Rapprochement with the Islamists 
The feared reemergence of the Islamists as a credible opposition force might be 
overstated by Rabil (2003). According to Eyal Zisser (1999a:14-18) the tendency 
during the last 15 years has been a steady rapprochement between the regime and the 
Islamists. Some seats have even been allocated to Islamist candidates in parliament. 
In addition to obviously attempting to co-opt the potential radicals in order to keep 
them under supervision, the regime seems to have altered its stance fundamentally 
towards the concept of the Islamist movement. Accepting the fact that the great 
majority of the Syrian population is Muslim is a manner of preempting Islam-based 
challenges to regime legitimacy. Furthermore, it seems the regime has discovered the 
benefits of becoming the most important state ally for many of the rejectionist 
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Islamist organizations in the region. Zisser does not rule out, however, that there is an 
inherent contradiction in this policy, considering that too much power to the Islamists 
could in the future become once again a destabilizing factor. Thus far, however, it 
seems that the Islamists have been unable to organize themselves into a coherent 
opposition movement. This could as well, of course, be the successful result of 
repression by the regime. 
Lack of a credible opposition 
Perthes (2003) insists that there are no true domestic challengers to the regime. There 
certainly are oppositional forces, but these have hitherto been content with acting 
within the confines the regime has set (Zisser 2004a, Abdulhamid 17.9.2004). In an 
interview with the Lebanese daily as-Safir (15.5.2003) head of the Syrian Security 
Service, General Bahjat Suleiman, even praised the opposition movement for being 
responsible in its activities: 
“In Syria, the regime does not have enemies but ‘opponents’ whose 
demands do not go beyond certain political and economic reforms such 
as the end of the state of emergency and of martial law, the adoption of 
a law on political parties and the equitable redistribution of national 
wealth” (ICG 2004b:10).  
Bashar al-Assad is, perhaps, the leader of a reformist faction within the regime, in 
opposition to the traditionalists who cannot accept any changes whatsoever from the 
line of the Baath of Hafez al-Assad, but he is not part of the ‘democratic opposition’ 
who wants to see fundamental changes to the way Syria is governed. The aim of 
Bashar al-Assad is to modernize the regime and the state in order to better meet the 
challenges of the future, to incrementally evolve the politics and structures of the 
regime, but with the overriding aim of ensuring the stability and survival of the 
regime. This has been the goal of Bashar al-Assad even before the death of his father, 
and did not come about as the result of outside pressure; on the contrary, coercion is 
more likely to stifle reforms (Strindberg 5.6.2003). Bashar al-Assad is allegedly no 
opponent of western-style democracy, but he maintains that as of yet, Syria lacks the 
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economic and educational sophistication to ensure that its implementation will not 
throw the nation into turmoil (Perthes 2003:14-23, Economist 22.3.2001).  
The opposition, working under slightly better conditions under Bashar al-Assad, is 
apparently not bent on a revolutionary-style reform of the regime as the U.S. 
seemingly prefers, but favor incremental change that does not risk destabilizing the 
country. There is scant evidence of the pressure the U.S. is applying towards Syria is 
being helpful to the Syrian opposition to the regime. The Syrian state is no longer 
regarded by the Syrians themselves as a particularly strong state (Abdulhamid 2004). 
The level of economic despair and manifest weakness on the international scene are 
conducive to feelings of the loss of omnipotent power on the regime’s behalf. For 
many Syrians the rapid fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq shed many 
illusions as to the ability of their own regime to stand up to the military and political 
might of the U.S. (ICG 2004b:9). Within an atmosphere of besiegement from the 
U.S., opposition to the ruling elite can be painted as only aiding the enemy, and 
consequently dissidents risk being identified as traitors by the very same people they 
seek to mobilize (Hirst 14.8.2003, Fahim 17.12.2003, Hinnebusch 2004).  
The relatively mild reprimands of the regime in response to the outpouring of lament 
at the lack of political freedoms is a testament to the low level of threat the regime 
perceives from the dissenters to its hold on power (Cobban 2003), and consequently 
of the impact those considerations has on the conduct of foreign policy. The result is 
a situation where the regime is struggling to reinvent itself, to reform, to reappraise 
the role of the party in the state, and to allow for some measure of dissent, but not yet 
arriving at the formula for evolving without risking their hold on power (Abdulhamid 
27.3.2004). 
Assessment of Model II 
This model looks at the precariousness of the state and regime, and the need this 
poses to employ unifying ideologies and exaggerated external threats. Those 
mechanisms rely on enmity towards Israel, and Hezbollah serves this end. The 
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problem with this approach is that Syria is not a patent basket-case. First; an 
argument can be made for the decline of irredentist ideology as a legitimating tool for 
the regime. That sufficient time has elapsed since the tumultuous days of post-
independence Syria to warrant an analysis of the Syrian state, and the regime that 
controls it as somewhat stable. Furthermore, Syria can in some respects be said to 
have started to prepare the ground for an improved relationship with Israel, and that 
the regime might not be as reliant on this conflict as a vehicle for mobilization and 
externalization of domestic problems. Although the model helps to shed light on the 
internal pressures the regime faces, it alone does not sufficiently explain Syria’s 




5. Conclusion: Revised omnibalancing 
In order to aptly describe Syria's foreign and security policy I propose to revise the 
omnibalancing model. The point is to acknowledge that domestic currents play an 
important part in determining the limits in the room for maneuver the regime has in 
the conduct of foreign policy, but still maintaining that external security threats hold 
most explanatory power when analyzing Syria’s policies. This model predicts that the 
regime, while primarily concerned with its own survival, is not dependent upon 
perpetual conflict with Israel in order to legitimate its rule by radical ideology, but 
that the ideational basis of the regime, and of the national identity, constrict the 
alternatives as to the nature of the peace that is possible with Israel. The question of 
Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah is a good indicator of the limits and opportunities 
this represents.  
Stephen David (1991) posits that the main threat to Third World elites come from 
domestic sources, and argues that regime-changes in the Third World more often than 
not comes in the form of domestic opponents of the regime getting the upper hand. 
However, the regime of Hafez al-Assad reached a considerable level of consolidation. 
By 1991 it was dubbed the ‘strongest weak state’ in the Third World by Daniel Pipes 
(1996:4-6). Although it is obvious that in the instance of Syria, there are very real 
external threats that the regime must react to. How it reacts is contingent upon its 
power relative to the power arrayed against it. However, how they choose to react to 
external pressures cannot be discerned solely from the pure equation of power 
balancing against one another, but one has to take into account the identity and 
interests of the regime, as they have come into being through the process of state and 
regime consolidation (Hinnebusch 2003:2). The role of the nation, as it were, plays a 
significant part in deciding how to react to outside pressure. This factor is naturally 
one of domestic origin, and gives guidance and direction. In my view, it serves the 
purpose of acting as red lines across which the regime may venture only at its peril. 
In the words of one anonymous Syrian official: 
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“They want us to expel the Palestinian factions, cut our lifeline support 
for Hizbullah and get the Syrian army out of Lebanon, and these are 
core interests in Syrian political identity. So when they ask us to give 
those issues up, it means that we will give up our identity” (Abdel-Latif 
15.4.2004). 
In my judgment it is also prudent to include economic considerations as a variable 
that influences regime stability. Ehteshami & Hinnebusch (1997:15-22) stresses that 
regimes have to balance between rational reasons of state, the legitimizing role of 
foreign policy which might seem irrational, and the need for capital accumulation and 
rent acquisition, and that David’s analysis is useful for elucidating the links between 
the foreign and domestic arenas in this respect.  
It is in this nexus of pressures between a need for rationality in the conduct of foreign 
policy, domestic expectations of fulfillment of a certain foreign policy role, regime 
legitimacy, internal stability and economic demands that the regime finds itself, 
balancing between them in order to retain their survival. Indeed, this mechanism is 
similar to the differences in short, medium and long term goals that Eyal Zisser 
(2001: Ch.5) stipulates as informing Syrian foreign policy. The immediate goals of 
ensuring territorial integrity (repossessing the Golan Heights), containing Israel, and 
furthering Syria’s preferences throughout the region contravenes Damascus’ longer 
term aims of arriving at some form of Arab unity project with Syria at the helm.  
5.1 The Two-Level game? 
I propose that the present challenge for Syrian security policy is the first instance 
where the absolute core interests of the state have been put in jeopardy. Ever since 
Syria lost the Golan Heights to the Israelis in 1967, this is the first time they face the 
prospect of significantly diminishing their chances of ever retaining them, by 
relinquishing control over Hezbollah, and without being promised any substantial 
rewards in return. By employing Robert D. Putnam’s (1988) conceptual model of the 
Two-Level game, we might be able to appreciate that there are absolute limits for 
what the regime can agree to. Even if Putnam ventures that his model is probably 
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most applicable to democratic settings, where the mechanisms of democracy will 
ensure the regime’s responsiveness to the will of the people, one could argue, as has 
Stephen David, that precisely this lack of democratic venting of popular displeasure 
can be highly dangerous for the regime. It is not advisable for the Syrian regime to 
ever fail in its endeavor to regain the Golan Heights, to do so would probably 
threaten the stability of the regime. Therefore one could say that there is a very small 
win-set on Level II, meaning that there are not many options that the Syrian regime 
has in its confrontations with the international community (Level I) that would be to 
the satisfaction of the Syrian society at large (Level II). By extension, sound 
judgment on policy, considering what is possible on Level II, could lead to ostensibly 
sub-optimal outcomes on Level I, at least from the perspective of other actors (the 
U.S. and the U.N.). In this way the external and domestic levels can be bridged, 
accentuating the existence of a threshold that it is not likely the regime can venture 
beyond without putting its security at risk.  
5.2 Placating Washington 
We see in this case a demonstration of the ability of the regime to attempt to balance 
the forces they are confronted with. After the end of the Cold War, and thus of Soviet 
support, it has been in Syria’s interest to win the good graces of the U.S. (JP 
10.11.2004). In fact Daniel Pipes (1996:88) maintains that even the peace process 
itself was to a significant degree mainly a matter of placating Washington in its 
efforts to pacify the Middle East, but the aim for Syria has all the time been to get on 
the U.S.’ good side27. Israel has no incentive to withdraw from the Golan Heights in 
the current situation; the border with Lebanon is relatively calm, the Golan Heights 
itself is peaceful, and domestic opinion is not in any hurry to relinquish the Golan 
Heights (Brom 20 04).  
                                              
27 Bashar al-Assad reaffirmed his intention to foster amicable relations with the US in an interview with The New York 
Times 2.12.2003.  
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Bashar al-Assad’s apparent dithering with regard to the demands made upon Syria 
from New York and Washington is in perfect harmony with the cunning for which 
Bashar al-Assad’s father was so renowned. By conceding to part of the U.S. 
demands, Bashar hopes to get away with keeping his more valued asset; Hezbollah. 
He cannot be seen to buckle under U.S.-pressure since so much of Syrian legitimacy 
is based on being the champion of Arab rights (Rahimi 9.1.2002). Bashar al-Assad 
has made attempts to appease the U.S. in its hunger for progress in its GWOT. 
Initially, he won praise from Washington by sharing information on the 9/11-
hijackers and granting U.S.-investigators access to Syrian prisons. Also, he closed 
down the offices of several Palestinian rejectionists’ organizations in Damascus. This 
did not suffice to wet the appetite for more Syrian cooperation, though. The 
information on the hijackers was soon yesterday’s story, and the offices that were 
closed down were meager press-fronts without any real significance for running 
operations in Israel (ICG 2004a: 8-10, Zisser 2003b). U.S. demands on Syria to 
tighten its control over the border areas with Iraq is yet another area that Syria can 
win the good graces of the U.S. The border has proved to be highly permeable, but 
Syria has publicly announced that it is making efforts to halt the flow of insurgents 
into Iraq, with such mixed results that the U.S. weary of Syria’s true intentions 
(Masland 8.11.2004).  
However, the U.S. and Syria have persistent conflicting interests in the region. Syria 
still sees the U.S. as being the purveyor of Israeli interests in the region, keeping 
Israel’s interests close to heart when pushing for talks. Against this back-drop, if the 
U.S. succeeds in turning Iraq into a U.S. ally, thereby weakening Iran, the Syrians 
will feel even more vulnerable (Moubayed 25.12.2003). When Syria is then pressured 
by the U.S. to terminate its bonds with Hezbollah, it becomes imperative not to 
further alienate the U.S., conforming to the old adage: “keep your friends close, but 
your enemies closer”.  
In a sense, the Syrian Regime can be said to attempt to balance against Israel, while 
signaling willingness to bandwagon with the U.S. and Europe. The Syrian policy 
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concerning the West has since 1991 been one of coveting the expected benefits of 
bandwagoning. As such, the two attitudes are not dichotomous, but are policies 
driven by different motivations (Schweller 1994). There are different issues at stake 
for the Syrian regime with regards to the West and Israel, and a strong U.S. 
identification with Israel’s security interest therefore leads to inevitable 
contradictions. Syria’s calculations do not always appear optimal in the eyes of the 
Western observer when the role of Israel in Syria’s security calculations is not fully 
appreciated. 
5.3 Final Analysis: The red line 
In conclusion, the Syrian regime is very much a rational calculating regime, which is 
capable of looking after its own interests, and is not in the throws of radical 
ideologies, nor is it stymied by unrelenting domestic pressures. In short; it is not a 
‘rouge’ regime, but a state that has security interests that at times are at odds with the 
U.S. and Israel. The ‘rouge’ argument used by the proponents of preventive war 
against Syria, falls on its own merit when one considers the claim by some pundits; 
that the invasion of Iraq was intended to make Syria reconsider its policies (Lemann 
17.2.2003), something that precludes the ‘rouge’ identity characteristics to begin 
with.  
The analysis shows that there have been no radical departures in the foreign policy in 
the area of interest under Bashar al-Assad, meaning there is no evidence for 
concluding that the death of Hafez al-Assad has altered the calculations of the regime 
with regard to its relationship with the Hezbollah. On the contrary, it seems that the 
new president is considerably closer to the leader of the Hezbollah than his father 
ever was. Moreover, the analysis indicates that the attempts at reform observed under 
Bashar were driven by the need for economic revitalization to avoid political 
destabilization, not in any effort to fundamentally reform the nature of the state.  
 98 
Giving up the strategic asset of the Hezbollah without getting something considerable 
in return is beyond the scope of any Syrian government. It is a red line the regime 
will not cross. The SALSA is regarded as a matter of the U.S. helping to secure the 
state of Israel, that it has nothing to do with the so-called GWOT (Moubayed 
30.10.2003). The present challenge posed by the U.S. is not only the practicality of 
the concrete demands being made, but the political ramifications of actually giving in 
to demands made by a state long demonized as an enemy of Syria. At any rate, threats 
that are limited to the economic sphere are not likely to force the hand of  Bashar al-
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